Israel often claims that it carries out assassinations to ensure Israel's security. Since its founding in 1948, Israel has carried out more assassinations than any other nation-state during the same time period. What has this strategy achieve and why?
Many observers and experts in global affairs think that assassinations are not a strategy and should not be adopted instead of a national strategy that is necessary for nation-building. A national project cannot be dependent on one or a handful of leaders. If a state-actor relies on assassinations to secure itself, then it cements its status as a renegade entity while fostering the image of the people whose leaders it assassinates as people with legitimate claims. Israel's increased rate of assassination after achieving a stalemate at best with the Palestinians in this recent war erodes its image as a normal nation-state, which defeats the purpose: national security. Aljazeera TV provided some insight into the history and outcomes of Israel's assassinations.
Since the establishment of the Israeli occupation state in 1948 until 2018, its security services have carried out more than 2,700 assassinations, during which they employed a variety of traditional and non-traditional tools, from poisoned toothpaste to drones and car bombs, according to the monitoring conducted by Israeli investigative journalist Ronen Bergman and published in his famous book "Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Targeted Assassinations in Israel". The goals of Israeli assassinations vary between targeting military leaders to influence the balance of conflicts, and targeting engineers and technicians to thwart attempts at technical and military development by opponents and deprive them of their cadres, but a significant percentage of Israeli assassinations were designed to achieve political goals in the first place, and the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, head of the political bureau of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), certainly falls into this category.
The assassination comes amidst a very bad strategic situation for Israel, as October 7 and its aftermath were a pivotal event that shook the foundations of the occupying state and dealt a fatal blow to the reputation of its army, imposing strategic shifts not only in the nature of the conflict between the Palestinians and the Israeli occupation, but in the entire regional political and security environment.
Internally, the attack broke many of Israel’s old “taboos,” the most important of which is the “doctrine of deterrence,” which has long been based on the idea that Israel’s clear military superiority over its opponents, and its continued use of brutal force against the Palestinians, will prevent any form of resistance or threat that could pose an existential challenge to the stability and survival of the Hebrew state and the well-being of its citizens.
The Al-Aqsa Flood blew up many of Israel's established beliefs about itself, and then the events that followed blew up the world's established beliefs about it. Over the course of nearly 10 months of the brutal war of extermination against the Gaza Strip, the occupying state did not succeed in achieving anything except killing more than 38,000 Palestinians, injuring more than 90,000 others, demolishing thousands of buildings, and displacing and starving all the people of Gaza, which showed its ugly face to the world and mobilized global support for the Palestinian struggle.
As for the strategic level, Israel's harvest was failure on all levels, even by the standards set by the occupying state itself. Israel did not succeed in recovering more than 4 living prisoners in a complex American-backed operation, during which it killed more than 200 Palestinians, while there are still no less than 115 prisoners in the hands of the resistance groups.
The occupation government and its army also failed to prevent Gaza from posing a threat to the occupied territories as they pledged at the beginning of the war, and Israel did not achieve its goal of eliminating the Hamas movement, and did not come close to achieving it in any sense.
Beyond that, the Israeli occupation state has become besieged by strikes on more than one front, to the north by the Lebanese Hezbollah and other factions, and to the south by the Yemeni Houthi Ansar Allah group, which launches drone attacks that have struck deep inside Israel near the US embassy, targeting ships heading to Israel, and disrupting navigation in the Bab al-Mandab Strait, one of the most important waterways in the world. Moreover, last April, Israel was struck by the first direct attack from Iranian territory with missiles and drones. Israel is no longer able to predict the next strike in terms of its size, source, or even the party that will carry it out. In light of this, the question on the table of the Israeli decision-maker here is: What can Israel achieve with more hostile operations in Gaza? The answer: More of what it has achieved over the past ten months: killing, destruction, displacement, and, of course, strategic failure. In short, Israel has failed militarily in Gaza, and nothing can change this fact after all this time. The solution that came up was to seek to achieve some kind of political victory cloaked in a military character, and assassinations, which Israel is good at, are an ideal arena for achieving this kind of victory. By targeting Palestinian resistance leaders abroad, such as Saleh al-Arouri and Ismail Haniyeh, and leaders of factions allied with Iran, such as the leader of the Lebanese Hezbollah, Fuad Shukr, the occupation government can offer its people a “temporary symbolic victory” that seeps into a torrent of failure. By proving its military presence outside its borders, all the way to Iran itself, Israel demonstrates its ability to act, restores some of its eroded deterrence, and transfers the battle, even partially, to the wider regional arena, away from the Gaza quagmire in which it is drowning up to its ears.
Israeli Assassinations: Between Tactical Success and Strategic Failure
Israel has always excelled in assassinating its prominent opponents, turning the world into a killing field. This is a distinctive mark that no one can deny for the Mossad and the security services of the occupying state. In many cases, Israeli assassinations were primarily motivated by revenge, including those operations that targeted thinkers and politicians such as the Palestinian Ghassan Kanafani and the Egyptians Gamal Hamdan and Salwa Habib and other intellectuals who confronted Israel with thought and pen.
At other times, assassinations sought to deprive Israel's opponents of their important cadres, as in the case of the Egyptian nuclear scientists Mustafa Musharrafa, Samira Moussa and Yehia El-Mashad. However, what can really be debated is the effectiveness of those assassinations that it committed in order to strategically weaken its opponents, as the occupying state has a record that can be strongly questioned in this regard.
If we take Hamas as an example, we can count dozens of assassinations of the movement’s political and military leaders over the past three decades, starting with engineer Yahya Ayyash in 1996, passing through Salah Shehadeh in 2002 and Ibrahim al-Maqadmeh in 2003, then the movement’s founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in 2004 and his successor Dr. Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi in the same year. The list extends to include the leader Nizar Rayyan in 2009, Ahmed al-Jaabari in 2012, and Raed al-Attar and Muhammad Abu Shamala in 2014.
These assassinations certainly caused confusion within the movement’s ranks for a period of time, but their impact was very marginal in the long run. Less than two years after the assassinations of Yassin and al-Rantisi, for example, Hamas swept the only democratic elections held at the time, while the assassinations of leaders and military engineers failed to prevent the movement’s military development, which Israel experienced with difficulty on October 7.
The same applies to the Islamic Jihad movement, whose founder, Fathi Shaqaqi, was assassinated by Mossad in 1995 in Malta, and a number of its cadres have been targeted since then. Despite this, the movement is still alive, and has even achieved a leap in its size and strength.
Using the same criterion to predict what is coming, we are not mistaken when we say that the policy of assassinations, no matter how effective it is, does not change much of the strategic situation. It is true that Ismail Haniyeh is an important leader on both the practical and symbolic levels, and his absence will certainly cause confusion for a period of time, but he does not play a clear role in leading military operations in Gaza, which means that the situation on the ground will not witness a major change.
Furthermore, Haniyeh is often classified by global and regional powers as a “more moderate and flexible leader” compared to Hamas leaders in Gaza. However, even if we go beyond this “Western” classification in the first place, it is certain that political leaders are often more open to “middle” negotiated solutions by virtue of their mission, unlike military leaders who want to “decisive” through battles, which means that if Israel truly wants to reach a deal to stop the war and release the prisoners, removing Haniyeh from the scene makes this goal more distant than ever.
In addition, the assassination will likely make the Palestinian resistance more determined to respond on the battlefield, and with assassinations also taking place in Lebanon, this adds an additional potential front for response. The third front will be Iran, which has been subjected to a kind of “security humiliation” since the assassination of Haniyeh took place on its territory. If we rule out that the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh was intended to directly impact the battlefield in Gaza, we must look for the real goals and political messages that this operation may contain and its potential repercussions on the broader security landscape in the region.
Certainly, one of the most important messages of this operation is directed at Hamas itself, and it is a clear Israeli declaration that all the movement’s leaders are targets for its fire, and that it is all about waiting for the right opportunity and place. Israel has confirmed for some time that it has placed Haniyeh at the top of the list of those targeted for assassination, and now it is carrying out its threat from the heart of Tehran, the capital most hostile to the occupying state in the region.
More broadly, Israel believes that the assassination of Haniyeh may disrupt the political momentum that the Palestinian cause has gained in recent months, by eliminating a “charismatic” leader who is believed to have gained good popularity as a representative of his country’s cause, especially in the countries of the so-called “global south.” There is no better evidence of this than the condemnations that the incident brought from important non-Western powers, starting with China and Russia, passing through Turkey, and reaching Malaysia and Brazil.
The assassination comes after a Chinese-sponsored "breakthrough" in an agreement to end the division between Palestinian factions earlier last month, and ahead of an expected visit by Haniyeh to Turkey at the invitation of local parties, which was expected to turn into a popular and political carnival in support of the Palestinian cause.
Beyond Haniyeh himself, Netanyahu wants to assassinate Haniyeh to create a dilemma for Hamas regarding negotiations over a prisoner swap and ending the war. If the movement chooses to withdraw from the negotiations in protest, Bibi will have gained a “political point” by placing the blame for the failure of the negotiations on the Palestinians, and will have gotten rid of the annoying pressure to end the war, which he believes his political future is bound to continue forever. However, if the movement chooses to continue the negotiations, this will allow him to claim that “military pressure” is bearing fruit and will force Hamas to make more concessions. Beyond Hamas and Palestine, the assassination of Haniyeh creates equally dangerous dilemmas for Iran. Showing Tehran as unable to protect a prominent ally in the heart of its capital not only raises doubts about its security cohesion and ability to confront external threats, but also drives a wedge into its relationship with its allies and casts doubt on its image as a reliable ally. Most importantly, it poses an early challenge to the new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, who is affiliated with the reformist camp, regarding how his country will respond to the incident.
If Iran chooses to implement a strong or broad response, this will create early tensions for the new president and hinder any potential efforts at Iranian-Western rapprochement, preventing which is a strategic goal for Netanyahu.
The United States is also one of the targets of Netanyahu’s blood-soaked political messages, given that the incident comes in the middle of the US presidential campaign, adding a new layer of complexity. With the US administration preoccupied with the repercussions of Biden’s withdrawal from the presidential race, Netanyahu hopes to receive a minimum of “secret rebuke” from his American ally.
In the meantime, the incident is likely to become a political topic of debate in the United States during the election season, a debate that is likely to harm the chances of the Democrats, who will be rebuked by their black, minority and Muslim electoral bases for not doing enough to deter Netanyahu and his government, and blackmailed by Israel’s allies who see the Democratic administration as not providing it with enough support. In contrast, the debate will be useful to the Republican hawks who will compete in showing support for Israel, led by former President and current candidate Donald Trump, a close ally of Netanyahu.
A “fictitious” victory in a quagmire of defeat Netanyahu is adept at manipulating American politics, and there is no better example of this than his speech to Congress a few days ago, during which he rallied Washington’s top brass around him in a political show of blessing the bloody genocide. But ironically, this is not the case for him in Israel. Upon his return from America, Netanyahu was met with fierce protests on July 29 and 30 after right-wing demonstrators stormed two military bases, including the Sde Teiman detention center, in response to the arrest of several Israeli soldiers accused of torturing a Palestinian prisoner in inhumane ways.
The incident caused great panic in Israeli political circles, and reflected a crisis between society and its political and military leadership, especially since the move came from Netanyahu's right-wing allies, not his opponents who accuse him of dragging his feet on the prisoner deal to serve his political interests.
Netanyahu has become politically trapped between a rock and a hard place, between his allies who do not see him as decisive enough with the Palestinians, especially with the resistance, despite all the killing and destruction in Gaza, and his opponents who see him as ready to sacrifice the prisoners, and perhaps burn the entire country, in order to remain in power.
If there is one thing these two parties agree on at the present time, it is that Israel has "failed" and "defeated," and the main reason for that is Netanyahu. In the face of that, what the prime minister and his political and military officials need most is a victory - even if it is symbolic - to restore the water to their faces.
The assassination of Haniyeh, and to a lesser extent Fuad Shukr, represents a partial solution to this problem. Although it comes from the quagmire of defeat, it will allow Netanyahu to brag about killing the most prominent political official in Hamas, after nearly 300 days of successive blows coming from Gaza. This “symbolic victory” will also allow supporters of the Israeli right, such as extremist Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and his gang, to take to social media platforms and the streets to express their joy at the killing of Shukr first and then Haniyeh. On the other hand, the families of the Israeli prisoners and the broader segment of citizens realize that Netanyahu may have thrown the prisoner deal under the train as a price to remain in power, and this adds a new layer of division to an already fragmented society, a large segment of which has reverted to the model of “gang societies,” which was the prevailing characteristic during the time of the Nakba and before it.
The assassination of Haniyeh and the leaders of the resistance factions in general is an inexpensive way for Israel to redefine victory, but at the same time it is an effective recipe for igniting a regional fire. It is not yet possible to predict how the various parties will respond, starting with Hamas and the Palestinian resistance, passing through Hezbollah and the rest of the resistance factions, and reaching Iran, which is believed to need to respond itself, whatever the level of response, in addition to predicting how Israel will respond later to these responses, but it is possible to point to three main scenarios that vary in their degrees of likelihood.
The first scenario is that Hamas, Hezbollah, and most importantly Iran will respond in a large-scale and equivalent manner to the Israeli assassinations, which necessarily means an Israeli counter-response and the ignition of more fronts, and perhaps the involvement of more parties in the conflict on both sides, which will result in more deaths, widespread economic turmoil, and disruption of international navigation.
This scenario is likely and cannot be ruled out given the difficulty of controlling the sequence of escalation and counter-escalation. However, the most likely scenario is that the resistance, already exhausted by the war, will not be able to launch a broad response at the present time, except for continuing operations on the Gaza front. As for Iran, it will probably prefer a calculated and carefully balanced response to avoid entering into a direct confrontation with Israel and the United States in the first days of the new president’s term.
The least likely scenario remains the resumption of serious negotiations on the prisoner exchange deal and ending the war at the present time, because the resistance is likely to become more rigid in the negotiations, while Netanyahu does not want these negotiations in the first place.
In the meantime, the hard facts on the ground will continue to impose themselves, namely that Israel did not win this war, and that assassinating Haniyeh or any other leader will not be enough to change that.
Le Monde and El Pais: Assassinations are evidence of an Israeli dilemma
The French newspaper Le Monde and the Spanish newspaper El Pais said that the policy of targeted assassinations puts Israel in a predicament and does not constitute a strategic victory over its enemies, but rather is an expression of an irresponsible policy that ended in the death of the ceasefire negotiations, and may lead the Middle East to a comprehensive war between it and Iran.
In an editorial entitled "The Dilemma of Targeted Assassinations," Le Monde wrote that these assassinations - which Israeli Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has turned into a goal in itself - prove Israel's ability to pursue its enemies, but their repetition also indirectly proves their great limitations, as they are merely tactical strikes that do not rise to the level of strategy.
Le Monde added that if the killing of Hezbollah leader Fouad Shukr was part of a classic cycle of attacks and counterattacks, the assassination of the head of the political bureau of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) Ismail Haniyeh raises more than one question, as Haniyeh was leading the movement's delegation in the negotiations supervised by the United States to end the war and release the hostages, but Netanyahu responded to the demands for a ceasefire in a way that could cause the entire Middle East to explode.
The French newspaper says that the political and military echelons in Israel believe that targeted assassinations allow Israel to be protected and buy time at the same time, but the facts belie this.
The liquidation operations have never prevented the emergence of an alternative to the slain leader who would be more dangerous to Israel, but Netanyahu has turned the assassinations into a goal in itself, as he is unable to provide the slightest form of solutions to the conflict, which does not deny the Palestinian people their legitimate right to their own state.
Le Monde concluded by saying that the partial paralysis that has afflicted Israel and its obsession with force is not without devastating effects on its society, which is becoming increasingly extremist as diplomacy and settlement policies decline.
An example of this is the storming of two military bases by far-right supporters in protest against the detention of soldiers suspected of assaulting a Palestinian prisoner, accompanied by ministers from the Likud (the prime minister's party), as well as masked members of a military unit known for its abuse of Palestinian prisoners.
El Pais newspaper predicted in an editorial titled "Irresponsible steps on the road to total war" that the assassinations, which included the head of Hamas's political bureau and leaders in Hezbollah, would bring the region to the point of no return, expanding the scope of armed conflict in the Middle East.
The Spanish newspaper said that the assassinations of Haniyeh and Shukr were major attacks outside the usual combat theater in Gaza, which reinforces the more pessimistic assumptions about the possibility of the Gaza war getting out of control.
According to El Pais, the assassination of Haniyeh is a major blow to the ceasefire negotiations mediated by Qatar, Egypt and the United States, as he was Hamas's chief negotiator, and it has now become very difficult for the movement to accept any kind of understanding with Netanyahu's government, thus diminishing the chances of alleviating the tragedy of Gaza civilians, 40,000 of whom Israel has killed so far.
The Spanish newspaper added that the assassination of Haniyeh and Shukr is a very dangerous escalation in the conflict between Israel and Iran after it reached a dramatic level last April, and is now approaching the point of no return, which if exceeded may make it impossible to find a peaceful way out of the war.
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