Gulf Power Shift Looms
The Middle East, Southwest Asia, and North Africa stand at a pivotal inflection point. What was once framed as a unipolar moment for U.S.-backed regional architecture—anchored by the Abraham Accords, Gulf security partnerships, and a contained Iran—is unraveling. A profound power shift is underway, one that defies the transactional diplomacy of the Trump era and exposes the fragility of Netanyahu's vision of a "Greater Israel" integrated into a stable, U.S.-led regional order. At the heart of this transformation lies not a monolithic "Arab world," but a fractured Gulf, where competing monarchies pursue divergent strategies, often at cross-purposes, reshaping the regional order from within.
The Illusion of Gulf Unity
The foundational premise of recent U.S. Middle East policy—that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states could be consolidated into a cohesive anti-Iran, pro-normalization bloc—has collapsed under the weight of intrinsic rivalries. There is no unity among the Gulf monarchies; rather, ongoing power dynamics suggest a broader, more chaotic transformation of the regional order.
The most consequential fissure runs between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Once close allies in the 2015 Yemen intervention, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have drifted into open strategic competition. Their divergence is not merely tactical but philosophical: Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) increasingly favors diplomatic accommodation and risk mitigation, while President Mohamed bin Zayed (MBZ) champions confrontational deterrence and transformative military action. This ideological split has manifested across multiple theaters, turning proxy conflicts into arenas for Gulf competition.
Yemen: The First Fracture
The Yemeni civil war laid bare the rift. While both states initially joined the Saudi-led coalition against Ansar Allah (the Houthis), the UAE significantly scaled back its direct military role in 2019, pursuing a distinct southern strategy. Today, Riyadh backs the internationally recognized Presidential Leadership Council, while Abu Dhabi supports the rival Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist force with its own ambitions along the Red Sea coast. The UAE's pursuit of influence in Aden, Mukalla, and Socotra has repeatedly clashed with Saudi security priorities, revealing competing visions for the Arabian Peninsula's southern flank.
Sudan: The New Arena
The Sudanese civil war has become the latest proxy theater. Saudi Arabia supports the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), while the UAE backs the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). This alignment is not accidental: Abu Dhabi's support for the RSF is part of a broader transnational strategy linking gold flows, port access, and influence networks across the Sahel and Horn of Africa. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has coordinated more closely with Turkey on Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia—a pragmatic recalibration aimed at counterbalancing Emirati influence. The war in Sudan thus reflects not just local power struggles, but the externalization of Gulf rivalries.
The Red Sea and Horn of Africa: A Strategic Chessboard
Beyond direct conflict zones, competition extends to the maritime domain. The UAE has expanded its footprint in Somaliland, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, securing port access and military facilities. Saudi Arabia, wary of Emirati encirclement, has deepened ties with Egypt and Sudan while exploring partnerships with Turkey. This scramble for influence along one of the world's most critical shipping lanes underscores how Gulf states now view regional security through a lens of competitive positioning rather than collective defense.
The Israel Factor: Normalization's Unintended Consequences
The Abraham Accords, heralded in 2020 as a diplomatic breakthrough, have paradoxically complicated Gulf alignments rather than simplifying them. The UAE was the first to normalize relations with Israel, seeking technology transfer, intelligence cooperation, and U.S. security guarantees. Yet this move has generated friction within the Gulf. Saudi officials have reportedly characterized the UAE as Israel's "Trojan horse" in the region—a partner whose alignment with Jerusalem could draw the Gulf into conflicts not of its choosing.
The ongoing U.S.-Israel-Iran confrontation has sharpened these tensions. While the UAE has openly coordinated with Israel on missile defense and reportedly conducted retaliatory strikes on Iranian territory, Saudi Arabia has maintained a more cautious posture. Riyadh's reluctance to join overt military operations reflects both domestic political constraints and a strategic calculation that escalation threatens its economic diversification agenda under Vision 2030. The result is a Gulf divided on the most fundamental question: how to respond to the region's most volatile confrontation.
Personal Enmity and Strategic Divergence
Beneath the geopolitical analysis lies a human dimension: the reported breakdown in relations between MBS and MBZ. Once close collaborators, the two leaders now embody competing visions for the Gulf's future. What is undeniable is that their divergent risk tolerances and strategic cultures have translated into tangible policy differences, from OPEC production decisions to approaches toward Iran and Islamist movements.
Qatar: The Gulf's "Black Sheep" or Strategic Hedge?
Qatar's distinct trajectory further complicates the regional picture. During the 2017–2021 blockade imposed by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt, Doha weathered isolation by deepening ties with Turkey and Iran. The rift was driven by Qatar's support for Islamist networks, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood—a movement viewed by other Gulf monarchies as an existential threat to dynastic rule.
Today, Qatar has emerged not as a pariah but as an indispensable mediator. Its hosting of U.S. military facilities, its dialogue channels with Tehran, and its role in Afghanistan and Gaza negotiations have granted Doha disproportionate influence. Turkey's strategic partnership with Qatar—anchored in shared support for political Sunni Islam and mutual suspicion of Saudi-Emirati ambitions—has created a counterweight to the Riyadh-Abu Dhabi axis. This Turkey-Qatar nexus represents not merely an alliance of convenience but a competing vision for regional order, one that privileges diplomatic engagement and ideological flexibility over hardline containment.
The Four-Way Contest: Who Leads the Region?
The fragmentation of Gulf unity has opened space for a multipolar competition among four principal contenders:
Turkey, positioning itself as the heir to Ottoman-era influence and a champion of political Islam, leverages military capabilities, economic ties, and ideological appeal to extend its reach from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Horn of Africa.
Saudi Arabia, as custodian of Islam's holiest sites and the region's largest economy, seeks to reclaim leadership through a blend of religious authority, economic statecraft, and cautious diplomacy—most notably in its China-brokered rapprochement with Iran.
Israel, despite military prowess and technological advantage, faces mounting security and economic pressures. Its vision of integration into a stable regional order is challenged by persistent Palestinian resistance, Iranian retaliation, and the limits of Arab normalization without a political horizon for the Palestinians.
Iran, a state-civilization with deep historical roots and a network of proxy allies, has demonstrated resilience despite sanctions and military pressure. Its proposed Gulf security framework—excluding Western powers and emphasizing regional ownership—has reportedly garnered interest from Saudi Arabia and Oman.
This four-way contest is not a zero-sum game but a complex interplay of alignment, hedging, and opportunism. Smaller Gulf states—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman—navigate these currents with varying degrees of autonomy, often prioritizing regime survival over ideological alignment.
Historical Context and the Path to Transformation
To understand the present moment, one must recall the regional balance of the 1960s–1970s, when Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar were relatively weak states surrounded by revolutionary republics: Egypt under Nasser, Ba'athist Iraq and Syria, and Pahlavi Iran. Subsequent wars—the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf Wars, U.S. interventions post-9/11, and the 2011 Arab Spring—reshaped this order, inadvertently empowering U.S.-backed players: Israel and the Gulf monarchies.
Today, however, the assumptions underpinning that order are eroding. U.S. regional bases have proven vulnerable; Israel faces unprecedented security challenges; and Gulf economies, despite vast sovereign wealth, confront the dual pressures of energy transition and regional instability. The recent Iran war has accelerated this reassessment, exposing the limits of external security guarantees and the costs of fragmented responses.
Toward a New Gulf-Centered Order?
Amid this uncertainty, a potential pathway for transformation is emerging. Iran has proposed a Gulf security framework that excludes Western powers, emphasizing regional dialogue and mutual non-aggression. Reports suggest Saudi Arabia and Oman have engaged constructively with this initiative, particularly regarding the security of the Strait of Hormuz. This points to a possible emerging balance centered on Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Oman—a triad that could marginalize more confrontational actors like the UAE and Israel while diminishing the roles of smaller, more vulnerable Gulf states.
Such a scenario would represent a profound shift: from a U.S.-guaranteed order to a regionally negotiated equilibrium. It would require Saudi Arabia to reconcile its rivalry with Iran while managing its competition with the UAE; it would demand that Iran moderate its proxy activities in exchange for regional acceptance; and it would necessitate that external powers, including the United States and China, adapt to a more autonomous Gulf diplomacy.
Turkey's role in this configuration remains uncertain. While Ankara possesses significant military and economic leverage, its ambitions in the Arab world face structural limits: linguistic, cultural, and historical barriers that constrain its ability to dominate Gulf affairs. Qatar's position is similarly ambiguous: its mediation credentials grant it influence, but its dependence on gas exports and vulnerability to regional pressure limit its strategic autonomy.
Beyond Binary Narratives
The changing Middle East defies simplistic narratives of "Sunni vs. Shiite," "authoritarianism vs. democracy," or "U.S. allies vs. axis of resistance." What is unfolding is a complex, multi-layered reordering driven by intra-Gulf competition, the limits of external patronage, and the resilience of regional actors. The vision of a unified Gulf bloc integrated with Israel under U.S. auspices has given way to a more fragmented, contested, and ultimately more authentic regional politics.
For policymakers in Washington, Brussels, and beyond, the lesson is clear: sustainable stability in Southwest Asia and North Africa cannot be imposed from outside. It must emerge from inclusive regional dialogue that acknowledges the legitimate security concerns of all states—including Iran—while creating mechanisms for managing competition without escalation. The Gulf power shift looms not as a crisis to be managed, but as an opportunity to reimagine a regional order rooted in sovereignty, dialogue, and shared interest. Whether that opportunity is seized will determine not only the future of the Middle East, but the trajectory of global energy security, migration flows, and great-power competition for decades to come.
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