Showing posts with label religion and conflict. Show all posts
Showing posts with label religion and conflict. Show all posts

Saturday, May 09, 2026

Beyond the News: Understanding Mojtaba Khamenei's Silence Through the Lens of Shia Religious Tradition

    Saturday, May 09, 2026   No comments

 In the weeks following the appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei as Iran's new Supreme Leader, a steady drumbeat of speculation has echoed through Western newsrooms and diplomatic corridors. Why has he not appeared on television? Why are there no public speeches, no filmed addresses to the nation? For many observers accustomed to leaders who cultivate visibility as a form of authority, the silence reads as a signal of crisis—perhaps a serious injury, perhaps heightened security concerns, perhaps political instability. This interpretation overlooks a fundamental aspect of Shia religious culture: that for many of its most senior clerics, reclusion is not a symptom of weakness, but a deliberate expression of spiritual authority.


The news that sparked this international attention is itself significant. According to Iranian officials, Mojtaba Khamenei sustained bruises to his back and knee during a February attack targeting the compound of his late father, Ali Khamenei. Officials have since confirmed his recovery and emphasized that he remains in full health, dismissing rumors of more severe injuries. They have also noted that adversaries actively seek any image, voice recording, or document related to the new leader that could be exploited. While these details matter, they have largely overshadowed a deeper question: what does public silence mean within the framework of Shia religious leadership?

To understand Mojtaba Khamenei's current approach, it helps to look beyond the political theater of the Islamic Republic and toward the broader traditions of Twelver Shia Islam. For centuries, many of its most revered religious authorities have consciously avoided the spotlight. They issue guidance through written jurisprudence, deliver sermons through trusted representatives, and receive visitors only on rare, carefully managed occasions. Public visibility is not a measure of their influence; indeed, for many, discretion reinforces their spiritual stature.

Nowhere is this tradition more clearly embodied than in the figure of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, based in Najaf, Iraq. Widely regarded as one of the most influential Shia clerics in the world, Sistani has spent decades maintaining an exceptionally low public profile. He does not deliver Friday sermons in person; instead, his messages are read aloud by appointed representatives. He rarely grants interviews, and when he does meet with foreign dignitaries—as he did with Pope Francis in 2021—the encounters are private, unfilmed, and released only in summary form. His authority flows not from camera presence but from scholarly reputation, moral consistency, and the trust of millions of followers who look to his written rulings for guidance.

This stands in contrast to the public style of Ali Khamenei, whose role as Iran's Supreme Leader required a different mode of engagement. The position of Velayat-e Faqih—Guardianship of the Jurist—is uniquely Iranian, blending religious authority with direct political leadership. In that context, regular televised addresses, public sermons, and visible diplomatic engagement became part of the job. Ali Khamenei's accessibility was not merely personal preference; it was institutional expectation. Still, Khamenei rarely led Friday prayers. Instead, his representatives did. Even within Iran, many senior clerics outside the formal structures of the state have preferred the quieter path of scholarly retreat.

It is against this backdrop that Mojtaba Khamenei's current silence may be more meaningfully understood. Those who know him describe a man who has long avoided the camera, preferring to work behind the scenes and communicate through trusted intermediaries. If he chooses to follow the model of figures like Sistani—releasing statements through representatives, limiting public appearances, and focusing on written guidance over televised performance—it would represent not a break from tradition, but a return to it. Such an approach would emphasize the spiritual and scholarly dimensions of religious leadership, distinguishing them from the performative demands of modern political communication.

Western media and political analysts, however, often interpret silence through a different lens. Accustomed to leaders who use media visibility as a tool of legitimacy, they may read absence as vulnerability. This is not just a difference in style; it reflects a deeper gap in cultural understanding. In secular political frameworks, public presence is often equated with control, transparency, and strength. In many Shia religious traditions, however, humility, scholarly focus, and insulation from political spectacle are seen as virtues that protect the integrity of religious authority.

This is not to suggest that security concerns or health considerations are irrelevant in Mojtaba Khamenei's case. The attack that injured him was real, and the geopolitical tensions surrounding Iran's leadership are undeniable. But to reduce his public silence solely to these factors is to miss a richer, more nuanced explanation rooted in religious practice and cultural expectation. Just as one would not judge a monk's devotion by his Twitter following, one should not assume a Shia cleric's influence by his television ratings.

For observers seeking to understand Iran's evolving leadership, the lesson is not to ignore the facts of injury or security, but to place them within a broader context. Mojtaba Khamenei may yet choose to address the public directly; he may continue to communicate through representatives; he may adopt a hybrid approach that blends tradition with the demands of modern governance. Whatever path he takes, recognizing the Shia clerical tradition of reclusion allows for a more informed, less speculative interpretation of his choices.

In an age where visibility is often mistaken for legitimacy, the quiet authority of a reclusive religious leader can be easy to misunderstand. However, for millions of Shia Muslims, guidance does not require a camera, it requires wisdom, consistency, and moral clarity. Whether Mojtaba Khamenei speaks from a podium or through a written statement, his influence will ultimately be measured not by how often he appears, but by the substance of what he offers and the trust he inspires. Understanding that distinction is essential not only for accurate journalism, but for meaningful engagement with one of the world's most complex and consequential religious-political traditions.


Wednesday, April 15, 2026

Analyzing the Potential Role of General Asim Munir in Iran‑U.S. Diplomacy

    Wednesday, April 15, 2026   No comments
Diplomacy between Iran and the United States has traditionally been channeled through civilian foreign ministries, backchannel envoys, and multilateral frameworks. Should Pakistani Army Chief General Asim Munir assume an active, visible role in facilitating talks between the two nations, it would represent a deliberate recalibration of diplomatic signaling. Such a move would not merely reflect personal stature, but would communicate institutional commitment, security prioritization, and alignment with an evolving regional security architecture.

Analyzing this scenario reveals why a military figure, rather than Pakistan’s prime minister or foreign minister, could carry unique diplomatic weight, what cultural and strategic dimensions his involvement introduces, and how this might intersect with broader efforts to stabilize an emerging network of Muslim-majority security partnerships.

The primary rationale for deploying a military chief lies in the nature of the assurances Iran has historically sought from Washington: binding security guarantees, non-interference commitments, and mechanisms that outlast electoral cycles or partisan shifts. Civilian leaders in Pakistan, like their counterparts elsewhere, operate within volatile political ecosystems, coalition dependencies, and shifting parliamentary majorities. A military chief, by contrast, embodies institutional continuity, direct command over national security apparatuses, and a long-standing role in Pakistan’s strategic foreign policy. By placing General Munir at the center of Iran‑U.S. dialogue, Pakistan would signal that any resulting understandings are backed by its defense establishment, not merely by a transient government. For Tehran, which has repeatedly emphasized regime security and protection from external coercion, this military-backed diplomacy offers a tangible anchor of credibility.

The religious and cultural dimensions of Munir’s involvement also warrant careful consideration, though not through a reductive sectarian lens. Pakistan’s military leadership has historically operated at the intersection of Islamic cultural diplomacy, counterterrorism coordination, and regional security management. General Munir’s operational experience across diverse Muslim contexts, combined with Pakistan’s tradition of leveraging shared religious-cultural frameworks to build trust, could facilitate discreet channels of communication that civilian diplomats might find constrained by protocol or domestic political optics. For Washington, recognizing these dimensions means understanding that Pakistani military diplomacy often functions as a stabilizing interlocutor in regions where religious identity intersects with security calculus. The strategic implication is clear: a figure who commands institutional respect across sectarian and national lines can help de-escalate mistrust, provided the U.S. engages with cultural fluency rather than instrumentalization.

This diplomatic posture gains further significance when viewed against Pakistan’s deepening defense ties with Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Joint exercises, training agreements, and strategic dialogues have increasingly positioned Pakistan as a connective node in a loose but consequential security corridor spanning the Gulf, Anatolia, and South Asia. While this is not a formalized alliance, it reflects a pragmatic convergence of interests: counterterrorism coordination, defense industrial cooperation, and efforts to reduce regional polarization. Integrating Iran into a Pakistan-mediated diplomatic framework could serve as a stabilizing counterweight to isolation-driven security dilemmas. If Munir’s involvement helps translate Iran‑U.S. understandings into actionable security arrangements, it could function as a missing link in a broader architecture that prioritizes de-escalation, economic reintegration, and institutionalized crisis management among Muslim-majority states.

Nevertheless, the potential of such military-led diplomacy must be weighed against inherent constraints. Over-militarizing diplomatic processes risks marginalizing civilian institutions, complicating long-term democratic accountability, and triggering skepticism from Iranian hardliners or U.S. congressional actors wary of defense-centric negotiations. Moreover, Pakistan’s own economic vulnerabilities and domestic political transitions could limit its capacity to sustain high-stakes mediation without robust international backing. For the arrangement to succeed, military diplomacy must eventually interface with civilian statecraft, multilateral verification mechanisms, and transparent economic incentives to ensure durability beyond security guarantees.

In sum, General Asim Munir’s active participation in Iran‑U.S. talks would signal a strategic shift toward institutionalized, security-first diplomacy. It would underscore Pakistan’s evolving role as a regional stabilizer, leverage cultural and operational credibility to bridge trust deficits, and align with a nascent network of Muslim-state security cooperation. While not a substitute for comprehensive civilian diplomacy, such military-backed engagement could provide the continuity and assurance necessary to convert fragile understandings into durable stability. The ultimate test will lie in whether this approach can be integrated into inclusive, multilateral frameworks that balance security, sovereignty, and economic development across a deeply interconnected region.


Tuesday, October 07, 2025

Pope Leo XIV Backs Vatican’s Stark Condemnation of Gaza “Massacre” Igniting Diplomatic Tensions

    Tuesday, October 07, 2025   No comments

 Pope Leo XIV’s Strong Gaza Remarks Set Stage for Historic Middle East Pilgrimage

The Vatican’s sharp condemnation of the war in Gaza comes at a pivotal moment—just weeks before Pope Leo XIV embarks on his first international journey as pontiff to two Muslim-majority nations in the Middle East. On Tuesday, the Holy See announced that the Pope will visit Türkiye from November 27 to 30, followed by Lebanon from November 30 to December 2. The trip, described as an “apostolic visit” to Lebanon at the invitation of the country’s president and local Church leaders, marks a significant early diplomatic and spiritual initiative for the new Pope. Against the backdrop of escalating regional tensions and deepening humanitarian crises, his upcoming pilgrimage is widely seen as an effort to promote interfaith dialogue, Christian–Muslim coexistence, and peace in a region scarred by conflict—making his recent, unflinching remarks on Gaza not only a moral statement, but a prelude to a broader mission of reconciliation.

In a rare and forceful intervention, Pope Leo XIV has publicly endorsed one of the Vatican’s strongest condemnations yet of Israel’s military campaign in Gaza—describing it as a “massacre” and urging the world not to grow numb to the daily slaughter of civilians, especially children. The Pope’s remarks, made this week from his summer residence in Castel Gandolfo near Rome, mark a significant escalation in the Holy See’s stance on the Israel–Gaza war and have drawn sharp rebuke from Israel’s embassy to the Vatican.

Pope’s top diplomat blasts Israel’s Gaza offensive as ‘ongoing massacre’

The controversy stems from an interview given by Cardinal Pietro Parolin, the Vatican’s Secretary of State and its top diplomat, on the second anniversary of Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack on Israel. While Parolin unequivocally denounced that assault—calling it “inhuman and indefensible” and expressing prayers for the remaining hostages—he reserved his harshest language for the consequences of Israel’s retaliatory campaign.


“The war between Hamas and Israel has had catastrophic and inhuman consequences,” Parolin told Vatican media. “I am shocked by the daily death of so many children, whose only sin seems to be that they were born there.” He warned against normalizing the violence: “We fear becoming accustomed to this massacre. It is unacceptable and unjustifiable to reduce human beings to mere ‘collateral damage.’”

Pope Leo XIV, who assumed the papacy in May following the death of Pope Francis, stood firmly behind Parolin’s words. When asked by reporters about Israel’s angry response, the Pope said simply: “The Cardinal expressed the position of the Holy See very well.”

That position, however, has ignited a diplomatic firestorm.

In a statement posted on X (formerly Twitter), Israel’s embassy to the Vatican expressed “regret” that the interview “focused on criticizing Israel while ignoring Hamas’s continued refusal to release hostages or end its violence.” The embassy took particular offense at the use of the word “massacre,” arguing that it wrongly equates Israel’s actions with those of Hamas. “There is no moral equivalence between a democratic state defending its citizens and a terrorist organization seeking to kill them,” the statement read. “We hope future statements will reflect this crucial distinction.”

Yet the Pope’s message went further. Speaking with palpable sorrow, he acknowledged the trauma of October 7—“a terrorist attack that killed more than 1,200 people”—but immediately juxtaposed it with the staggering toll in Gaza. “Over two years… we speak of 67,000 Palestinians killed,” he said, citing figures from Gaza’s Hamas-run health ministry. “This makes us reflect on the depth of violence and evil humanity is capable of.”

The numbers remain contested, but the human cost is undeniable. According to the AFP, 1,219 people—mostly civilians—died in Hamas’s initial assault. In response, Israel launched a military operation that has claimed at least 67,160 Palestinian lives, displaced nearly the entire population of 2.3 million, and left much of the enclave in ruins.

Cardinal Parolin emphasized that while self-defense is a legitimate right, it must adhere to the principle of proportionality—a cornerstone of just war theory long upheld by Catholic teaching. “The war to eliminate Hamas militants cannot ignore that it is being waged against an exhausted, defenseless population living on land whose buildings have been reduced to rubble,” he said.

He also issued a pointed critique of global inaction: “The international community appears paralyzed. Nations with influence have done nothing to stop this ongoing massacre.” And in a veiled but unmistakable reference to arms suppliers, he added: “It is not enough to say what is happening is unacceptable and then allow it to continue. We must seriously question the legitimacy of continuing to supply weapons used against civilians.”

This shift in tone from the Vatican is notable. Historically, the Holy See has favored quiet diplomacy and measured language in Middle East conflicts. But under Pope Leo XIV—a pontiff already signaling a more outspoken moral leadership—the Church appears unwilling to remain silent in the face of what it sees as a humanitarian catastrophe compounded by global indifference.

The Pope’s call is clear: end the hatred, return to dialogue, and pursue peaceful solutions. But as bombs continue to fall and children keep dying, his words stand as both a spiritual plea and a stark indictment of a world that watches, yet fails to act.

In the eyes of the Vatican, silence is no longer neutrality—it is complicity.

 

"Two satellite images show how Israel 'wiped out' Gaza City"

Before


After





Monday, October 21, 2024

The Mufti of the Sultanate of Oman issues an official statement about the death of Sinwar

    Monday, October 21, 2024   No comments

A few hours after the Grand Mufti of the Sultanate of Oman, Sheikh Ahmed bin Hamad Al-Khalili, mourned the Palestinians and “the entire nation for the martyrdom of the head of the political bureau of the Hamas movement", Yahya Sinwar, calling on the nation to support the resistance with all its might, he issued a strongly worded second statement against anyone who mocks the martyrs of the resistance. His Eminence said in a statement on Saturday: “No one mocks the honorable people who die as martyrs in the fields of honor in jihad for the sake of God except the vile, who has been deprived of a mind that enables him to think, (And he for whom Allah has not given light - for him there is no light). 

 The Grand Mufti’s statement came said, Friday: “We received with pride and honor the news of the martyrdom of the heroic leader Yahya Sinwar, after he spent a period in jihad and the enemy was unable to capture him.” He added, praising Sinwar: “Congratulations to him, as he passed away facing the enemy and not turning his back. For that, we, the struggling Palestinian people, and the entire nation offer our condolences.”

Al-Khalili continued: “It is a matter that calls for the entire nation to unite, and for its scholars to rise like the wind sent forth to defend its rights, and to urge it to stand up to the Zionist entity, and to support this resistance with all its might.”

The Grand Mufti of Oman praised what Sinwar had offered, stressing that “he passed away to his Lord after a journey full of holy jihad, and joined those who preceded him, men who were true to their covenant with God,” expressing his hope that those who follow him “will fill his void with the same determination and resolve.”

The Grand Mufti of Oman concluded his post by saying: “The entire nation must unite, and its scholars must rise like the wind sent forth to defend its rights,” he said. We received with great pride the news of the martyrdom of the heroic leader Yahya Sinwar, after a long career in the holy jihad, following in the footsteps of his jihadist predecessors. We hope that someone will soon succeed him to fill his void with the same determination and resolve. The entire nation must unite, and its scholars must rise like the wind to defend its rights.


Thursday, December 28, 2023

Religion and war: Modern Islamic religious institutions and Gaza War

    Thursday, December 28, 2023   No comments

There are about four centers of traditional religiouscenters of power in the modern Islamic world: Alazhar representing the so-called mainstream Sunni Islam, Saudi Arabia representing the Salafi Islam, the official sect of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Turkey under the Islamist JDP drawing authority from the fact that Turkey represented the last pan-Islamic government, and Shia centers of religious power represented by Qom (Iran), and Najaf (Iraq). The most populous Muslim nation, Indonesia, has not played a role in shaping the religious discourse, rather was a battleground for influence exerted by other centers of Religious power. 

What role and what position have these religious centers of power and authority and other national and regional religious institutions taken?

Salafism and the Gaza war


Since the start of Western colonialism, Islam has played some public role, even through silence. Saudi edition of Islam played a prominent role in the West’s war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. It created the interpretative foundation that allowed Salafists to fund and recruit fighters in support of what they called, “Islamic Jihad”. That religious propaganda resulted in the production of groups like al-Qaeda, which launched its direct attack on the US in 2001 and justified it by US support for Israel. 23 years later, with Israel carrying its most destructive and deadly attack on Palestinians, and the Saudi religious institutions, especially the office of the Mufti, went totally silent. Perhaps worried about revisiting the connection between Salafism and terrorism, the Muftis now limiting his role to addressing the Islamic rulings about personal hygiene and family relations, and leaving all other matters to the crown prince, who just visited him to check on his health.

 

Al-Azhar balancing act: support political leadership and make public statements

 

The Council of Senior Scholars at Al-Azhar Al-Sharif confirmed today, Thursday, that the massacres committed by the Israeli occupation in the Gaza Strip are “a disgrace to all those who support it with money or weapons.”

 

The Commission, headed by the Sheikh of Al-Azhar, Ahmed Al-Tayeb, said that these massacres will be a disgrace to all those who are silent about the crimes of the occupation, pointing out that the position of the Council of Senior Scholars is clear regarding this aggression against the Palestinian people.

 

The Commission announced its rejection of displacing Palestinians “from their homeland to any other place,” noting that the occupation has gone too far in its aggression, killing children and women, and striking mosques, churches, hospitals, schools, and homes, in and around Gaza.

 

The Commission also condemned the "shameful positions of the countries and governments that support the occupation" in its aggression against the Palestinian people, calling on them to listen to the voice of their people defending this issue.

 

Lebanon’s Sunni Shia divide
 

Dar Al-Fatwa suppresses sheikhs: Criticism of Geagea is forbidden!

With Shia Hezbollah direct support to Hamas in Gaza, the rest of the Sunni community is more interested in appeasing regional powers and preserving the political balance in the country than taking position on the war.

The Grand Mufti of the Republic, Sheikh Abdel-Latif Derian, came to the thoughts of Maarab and Al-Saifi, who were disturbed by the tweets of the Assistant Inspector General of Dar Al-Fatwa, Sheikh Hassan Merheb, so he decided to muzzle the mouths of the sheikhs and prevent them from expressing their opinions and political positions.

 The message delivered by the head of the Lebanese Forces Party, Samir Geagea, to Dar al-Fatwa, in protest against the positions of the Assistant Inspector General of Dar al-Fatwa, Sheikh Hassan Merheb, on his party and the Phalange Party, against the backdrop of their positions on the war on Gaza and the resistance against the Israeli enemy in Palestine and Lebanon, did not go unnoticed. The message woke up the Grand Mufti of the Republic, Sheikh Abdel Latif Derian, from his stupor. Although “His Eminence” did not move in the face of the poor living conditions of the imams of the mosques and Sharia judges, and in the face of the repercussions of the crisis on the institutions affiliated with Dar al-Fatwa and its endowments, and he was not moved by the deteriorating living and political conditions of the Sunni community, he rose up to silence the sheikhs and “hold their breath” for the sake of Samir Geagea. And Sami Al-Jamil. As a reminder, the first was convicted of killing a Sunni prime minister, and the second declared a week ago that Israel does not attack Lebanon except in self-defense! Geagea’s “outrage” did not insult the Mufti, so he issued a decision to suppress the sheikhs and confiscate their opinions, in a statement distributed by the media office last Friday, in which he said: “Based on the directives of the Mufti of the Lebanese Republic, Sheikh Abdul Latif Derian, it is strictly forbidden to make political statements, positions or opinions for all employees of the religious apparatus and institutions affiliated with Dar al-Fatwa without first obtaining written permission from the General Directorate of Islamic Endowments and the relevant relevant departments,” he pointed out. “Dar Al-Fatwa does not adopt any political opinion that does not come directly from it and rejects any position that leads to strife or disagreement among the Lebanese.”

Saturday, March 25, 2023

Zelenskiy uses Islam for war purposes

    Saturday, March 25, 2023   No comments

Zelenskiy uses “Ramadan” and uses the power of “prayer” to help him “cleanse Ukraine” of the evil of the “Russian atheist.” An attempt to evoke the literature of “jihad” and incitement with the weapon of religion.

The Russian-Ukrainian war takes on a religious character in addition to its political, economic, and social dimensions, and this is evident when the Ukrainian president tried to use the month of Ramadan to serve him and his regime, and to tarnish the image of his Russian opponent.

Volodymyr Zelensky wrote on his Twitter account, a controversial tweet, taking advantage of the month of Ramadan, saying:

May the power of prayer in this holy month of Ramadan help us cleanse Ukraine of Russian godless evil, of those who truly believe in nothing, and that is why they are capable of such terror. Let the next Ramadan begin in peace and on the entire Ukrainian land free from Russia.


Zelensky is addressing the Ukrainian Muslim community, which is mainly represented by the Tatars residing in Crimea, which Russia has controlled since 2014, but according to commentators at the same time, he does not explain to the Muslims the reasons why his soldiers set out to burn the Qur’an, nor does he offer an apology or justification for them.

In his use of the description of the “Russian atheist,” Zelensky goes back to the inflammatory literature and descriptions that were used against the “atheist” Soviet Union in Afghanistan and the “jihad” against it, trying to incite Muslims against the current Russian regime, which no longer adopts atheism and communism as an approach, and embraces Muslims and their mosques. (Moscow's Grand Mosque was personally inaugurated by Putin), and he shares their religious events with them. Even the most prominent ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin is the "bearded Muslim" Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov.

Zelensky said in his tweet, which he published with a video clip: “A large part of Ukrainian society are Muslims, and we have the Crimean Tatars who are spending this blessed month in conditions of Russian persecution, and some of them are under other bombings on the fronts,” adding: “Let the month of Ramadan begin in peace and on peace... The entire Ukrainian land free of Russia.”

Activists and tweeters interacted with the Ukrainian president’s “religious” tweet, and some of them considered that the exploitation of religion in wars is no longer as effective as it was, while others found that the Kiev regime is far from caring and caring for Muslims, and a third said that the weapon of religion is imposed, regardless of the party we support.


Meanwhile, Kadyrov, visited with his troops, many of whom just returned from the frontlines in Ukraine, some will be going there soon. Here is his most recent release, a video, showing one of his elite units.

  


The following statement by Ramzan Kadyrov accompanied the video:

I took part in the ceremonial formation of the personnel of the 94th operational regiment of the 46th OBron of the North Caucasus Oblast of the VNG of Russia. The event was held on the occasion of the appointment of dear BROTHER Khasmagomed Magomadov to the post of unit commander. The corresponding order was signed by the Director of the Russian Guard, General of the Army, respected by us Viktor Zolotov.

I have known Khasmagomed Adikovich for many years. He showed himself excellently both while serving in the law enforcement agencies of the Chechen Republic, and in the zone of the special military operation in Ukraine. Khasmagomed has long proved in practice that he is a true warrior and patriot, for whom the interests of the Motherland are above all else.

Now, I am sure that under his competent and effective leadership, the 94th regiment will become one of the most combat-ready units of the National Guard. We will render full assistance to Khasmagomed in this task.

Being not only the head of the republic, but also the Colonel-General of the Russian Guard, I personally control the supply issues. I know perfectly well how much attention the director of the Federal Service for the National Guard Viktor Vasilyevich Zolotov pays to the issues of providing for the Russian Guards. We are deeply grateful to him for the comprehensive support of the units stationed in the Chechen Republic.


I sincerely congratulate Khasmagomed Magomadov on his appointment to the post of commander of the 94th operational regiment of the 46th OBron SKO VNG of Russia! I wish him good luck in his future service for the benefit of our great Motherland - Russia!




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