Current Events: How Salafism Became Saudi Arabia's Weapon of Last Resort in Yemen

Current Events: How Salafism Became Saudi Arabia's Weapon of Last Resort in Yemen

    Friday, September 25, 2026   No comments

 When the Mufti Goes to War

For more than a decade, Riyadh's framing of its war in Yemen was deliberately political. The Saudi-led coalition, launched in March 2015, described the Sanaa government led by the Houthi movement (Ansar Allah) as a militia, an Iranian proxy, an illegitimate power grabber — language drawn from the vocabulary of statecraft, not scripture. That vocabulary has now been abandoned. In a statement issued on September 25, 2026, Saudi Arabia's Grand Mufti and head of the Council of Senior Scholars, Sheikh Saleh bin Fawzan al-Fawzan, declared the Houthis "a misguided faction and deviant group" guilty of corrupting the creed itself, urged front-line troops to be ready to sacrifice their lives, and proclaimed that restoring security in Yemen under its "legitimate leadership" was among the most binding of duties.

The timing is not incidental. The statement came as the kingdom faced one of its most sustained Houthi escalations in years — ballistic missiles intercepted over Taif and Yanbu, drone strikes that killed coalition soldiers, renewed fighting around Taiz, and attacks that Riyadh says targeted its cities, with civil defense alerts even reaching the vicinity of Makkah before the all-clear was sounded. Washington, meanwhile, has declined to back its Saudi ally's push, holding to the ceasefire framework it negotiated with the Houthis in 2025.

This is what losing a war sounds like in the language of theology.

From "militia" to "apostate"

The shift is subtle but momentous. Calling an adversary a militia implies a political settlement is possible — militias can be disarmed, absorbed, negotiated with. Calling them a deviant sect that "excommunicates the companions of the Prophet," "sheds the blood of Muslims," and wages war on wali al-amr (those in authority) forecloses that possibility. A corrupt political actor can reform; a corrupt creed must be defeated. Al-Fawzan's message to the "stationed fighters and coalition forces" was explicit: unite your ranks, obey your commanders, and fight until the enemy's roots are cut — a call amplified by state media as one for the movement's complete defeat.

This is the grammar of sectarian war, and it is being activated now — eleven years into a conflict Riyadh once promised would end in weeks — for a reason that has nothing to do with theology and everything to do with the battlefield.

The audible silence of the ulama

What makes this intervention revealing is not what the mufti said, but what he and his institution have not said for over a decade. The Saudi religious establishment — the mufti, the Council of Senior Scholars, the sprawling Salafi scholarly apparatus built and bankrolled by the state — was notably quiet while the Yemen war became one of the gravest humanitarian catastrophes of the century. Tens of thousands dead, famine conditions, the bombing of markets, weddings, and a school bus — the ulama, who can pronounce on everything from Valentine's Day to video games, largely withheld judgment while the coalition carried the kingdom's name. Their silence was required by the political leadership, and it was faithfully observed.

But in the Syrian war, in Libya, in the blockade of Qatar, in the internal repression of dissident clerics — wherever the state needed either thunder or quiet, the institutions delivered. The pattern is consistent enough that the exception proves the rule: these bodies speak as independent moral authorities only in the moments when the ruling authority wants them to speak.

This is not a secret, but it is rarely spoken aloud, because the legitimacy of the Saudi state rests on the carefully cultivated fiction that the scholars' fatwas descend from revelation rather than from instructions. Al-Fawzan's statement, carried by the official Saudi Press Agency and swiftly amplified by Al Jazeera and Qatari media — Riyadh's rivals who understand perfectly the propaganda value of the kingdom's own clerics being conscripted into open-ended war — shatters that fiction in public.

Qatar's amplification

There is a second irony here. Qatari media, which has spent years branding the Saudi religious establishment as a fount of extremist ideology, now broadcasts the Saudi mufti's declaration to cut off the Houthis to a regional audience, because it serves Doha's immediate interest: embarrassing and bleeding Riyadh. The same Doha that shelters and platforms Muslim Brotherhood and various Salafi currents deploys the Salafi idiom against Saudi Arabia's enemies when convenient. Both Gulf monarchies, for all their feud, treat the region's religious vocabulary as an arsenal — loaded, aimed, and fired by political calculation, shelved when the calculation changes.

The Houthis, for their part, are acutely aware of the game; their own movement has long instrumentalized religious motifs against Saudi Arabia (accusing Saudi rulers of betraying religion). But here the mufti's charge deserves scrutiny rather than repetition. That the Houthis "excommunicate the companions of the Prophet" is an accusation, not a fact. Classical Zaydi doctrine — the theological tradition in which the movement is rooted — is distinguished from other sects precisely by its refusal to curse the sahaba or condemn the first caliphs as apostates; Zayd ibn Ali himself refused to renounce Abu Bakr and Umar, and the mainstream Hadawi school holds that they erred, not that they became unbelievers. The allegation of takfir (salafi doctrine that is a feature of Saudi religious teachings) is thus doing political work: it imports the most inflammatory sectarian charge in the Salafi repertoire and pins it on a movement whose own theology, whatever its other polemics, does not straightforwardly contain it. That the mufti's accusation need not be accurate to be effective is exactly what makes it a weapon. Sectarianism in this war is not a cause; it is a recruiting sergeant, a morale patch, and an exit-blocker.

The price of conscription

Riyadh's gamble carries a real cost, and it falls on the very institution being conscripted. The Saudi religious establishment spent the better part of a century and untold billions building global authority as the custodian of Salafi-Wahhabi orthodoxy — endowing chairs, printing Qurans, training imams from Indonesia to Michigan, branding itself as above the grubby business of politics. That authority is finite. Every time the mufti declares an open-ended holy war at the state's behest, the brand depreciates. A religious institution that can be summoned to bless a war it was silent about during its worst atrocities will, eventually, be seen for what the serious reader has always suspected it is: a department of the state, not a conscience above it.

There is a further danger. Sectarian framing is easy to escalate and nearly impossible to de-escalate. Once the Houthis are officially declared a deviant sect warring against true Islam — rather than a political-military adversary — any future Saudi government seeking the negotiated exit that Oman has been mediating for years inherits a theological obstacle of its own construction. You can sign a ceasefire with a militia. You cannot easily sign one with a heresy. The recent track of Saudi-Houthi talks, including the first Houthi delegation's visit to Riyadh, ran precisely on the older, political framing; the new religious framing threatens to lock the kingdom into a cycle of violence its own diplomats had been trying to escape.

What this tells us about religious institutions

The lesson of this episode is not about Islam, or even about Salafism as a body of doctrine. It is about the sociology of institutions that claim transcendent authority while depending on state patronage. Whether in Riyadh (Salafism), Cairo (al-Azhar) or Doha (Muslim Brotherhood), such institutions exhibit a remarkable elasticity: they can be silent about grotesque violence when silence serves, and thunderous about doctrine when thunder serves. Their scholars are not hypocrites in any simple sense — many are sincere men doing what the system demands — which is precisely the point. The system, not the men, sets the volume.

Al-Fawzan's statement should thus be read less as a religious event than as a battlefield communiqué issued in theological dress. The Saudi state, pressured on the ground, abandoned by its patron's caution, watching its Red Sea shipping and even its capital come under fire, has reached for its weapon of last resort: not a missile, but a fatwa. That it felt the need to do so says more about the state of the war than any intercepted drone ever could — and it will say even more, in the years to come, about the price the kingdom's religious authority paid for being, in the end, just another armory.

Update: Yemen Reponse

  

Beyond the News: Understanding Mojtaba Khamenei's Silence Through the Lens of Shia Religious Tradition

Beyond the News: Understanding Mojtaba Khamenei's Silence Through the Lens of Shia Religious Tradition

    Saturday, May 09, 2026   No comments

 In the weeks following the appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei as Iran's new Supreme Leader, a steady drumbeat of speculation has echoed through Western newsrooms and diplomatic corridors. Why has he not appeared on television? Why are there no public speeches, no filmed addresses to the nation? For many observers accustomed to leaders who cultivate visibility as a form of authority, the silence reads as a signal of crisis—perhaps a serious injury, perhaps heightened security concerns, perhaps political instability. This interpretation overlooks a fundamental aspect of Shia religious culture: that for many of its most senior clerics, reclusion is not a symptom of weakness, but a deliberate expression of spiritual authority.

The news that sparked this international attention is itself significant. According to Iranian officials, Mojtaba Khamenei sustained bruises to his back and knee during a February attack targeting the compound of his late father, Ali Khamenei. Officials have since confirmed his recovery and emphasized that he remains in full health, dismissing rumors of more severe injuries. They have also noted that adversaries actively seek any image, voice recording, or document related to the new leader that could be exploited. While these details matter, they have largely overshadowed a deeper question: what does public silence mean within the framework of Shia religious leadership?

To understand Mojtaba Khamenei's current approach, it helps to look beyond the political theater of the Islamic Republic and toward the broader traditions of Twelver Shia Islam. For centuries, many of its most revered religious authorities have consciously avoided the spotlight. They issue guidance through written jurisprudence, deliver sermons through trusted representatives, and receive visitors only on rare, carefully managed occasions. Public visibility is not a measure of their influence; indeed, for many, discretion reinforces their spiritual stature.

Nowhere is this tradition more clearly embodied than in the figure of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, based in Najaf, Iraq. Widely regarded as one of the most influential Shia clerics in the world, Sistani has spent decades maintaining an exceptionally low public profile. He does not deliver Friday sermons in person; instead, his messages are read aloud by appointed representatives. He rarely grants interviews, and when he does meet with foreign dignitaries—as he did with Pope Francis in 2021—the encounters are private, unfilmed, and released only in summary form. His authority flows not from camera presence but from scholarly reputation, moral consistency, and the trust of millions of followers who look to his written rulings for guidance.

This stands in contrast to the public style of Ali Khamenei, whose role as Iran's Supreme Leader required a different mode of engagement. The position of Velayat-e Faqih—Guardianship of the Jurist—is uniquely Iranian, blending religious authority with direct political leadership. In that context, regular televised addresses, public sermons, and visible diplomatic engagement became part of the job. Ali Khamenei's accessibility was not merely personal preference; it was institutional expectation. Still, Khamenei rarely led Friday prayers. Instead, his representatives did. Even within Iran, many senior clerics outside the formal structures of the state have preferred the quieter path of scholarly retreat.

It is against this backdrop that Mojtaba Khamenei's current silence may be more meaningfully understood. Those who know him describe a man who has long avoided the camera, preferring to work behind the scenes and communicate through trusted intermediaries. If he chooses to follow the model of figures like Sistani—releasing statements through representatives, limiting public appearances, and focusing on written guidance over televised performance—it would represent not a break from tradition, but a return to it. Such an approach would emphasize the spiritual and scholarly dimensions of religious leadership, distinguishing them from the performative demands of modern political communication.

Western media and political analysts, however, often interpret silence through a different lens. Accustomed to leaders who use media visibility as a tool of legitimacy, they may read absence as vulnerability. This is not just a difference in style; it reflects a deeper gap in cultural understanding. In secular political frameworks, public presence is often equated with control, transparency, and strength. In many Shia religious traditions, however, humility, scholarly focus, and insulation from political spectacle are seen as virtues that protect the integrity of religious authority.

This is not to suggest that security concerns or health considerations are irrelevant in Mojtaba Khamenei's case. The attack that injured him was real, and the geopolitical tensions surrounding Iran's leadership are undeniable. But to reduce his public silence solely to these factors is to miss a richer, more nuanced explanation rooted in religious practice and cultural expectation. Just as one would not judge a monk's devotion by his Twitter following, one should not assume a Shia cleric's influence by his television ratings.

For observers seeking to understand Iran's evolving leadership, the lesson is not to ignore the facts of injury or security, but to place them within a broader context. Mojtaba Khamenei may yet choose to address the public directly; he may continue to communicate through representatives; he may adopt a hybrid approach that blends tradition with the demands of modern governance. Whatever path he takes, recognizing the Shia clerical tradition of reclusion allows for a more informed, less speculative interpretation of his choices.

In an age where visibility is often mistaken for legitimacy, the quiet authority of a reclusive religious leader can be easy to misunderstand. However, for millions of Shia Muslims, guidance does not require a camera, it requires wisdom, consistency, and moral clarity. Whether Mojtaba Khamenei speaks from a podium or through a written statement, his influence will ultimately be measured not by how often he appears, but by the substance of what he offers and the trust he inspires. Understanding that distinction is essential not only for accurate journalism, but for meaningful engagement with one of the world's most complex and consequential religious-political traditions.

Analyzing the Potential Role of General Asim Munir in Iran‑U.S. Diplomacy

Analyzing the Potential Role of General Asim Munir in Iran‑U.S. Diplomacy

    Wednesday, April 15, 2026   No comments

Diplomacy between Iran and the United States has traditionally been channeled through civilian foreign ministries, backchannel envoys, and multilateral frameworks. Should Pakistani Army Chief General Asim Munir assume an active, visible role in facilitating talks between the two nations, it would represent a deliberate recalibration of diplomatic signaling. Such a move would not merely reflect personal stature, but would communicate institutional commitment, security prioritization, and alignment with an evolving regional security architecture.

Analyzing this scenario reveals why a military figure, rather than Pakistan’s prime minister or foreign minister, could carry unique diplomatic weight, what cultural and strategic dimensions his involvement introduces, and how this might intersect with broader efforts to stabilize an emerging network of Muslim-majority security partnerships.

The primary rationale for deploying a military chief lies in the nature of the assurances Iran has historically sought from Washington: binding security guarantees, non-interference commitments, and mechanisms that outlast electoral cycles or partisan shifts. Civilian leaders in Pakistan, like their counterparts elsewhere, operate within volatile political ecosystems, coalition dependencies, and shifting parliamentary majorities. A military chief, by contrast, embodies institutional continuity, direct command over national security apparatuses, and a long-standing role in Pakistan’s strategic foreign policy. By placing General Munir at the center of Iran‑U.S. dialogue, Pakistan would signal that any resulting understandings are backed by its defense establishment, not merely by a transient government. For Tehran, which has repeatedly emphasized regime security and protection from external coercion, this military-backed diplomacy offers a tangible anchor of credibility.

The religious and cultural dimensions of Munir’s involvement also warrant careful consideration, though not through a reductive sectarian lens. Pakistan’s military leadership has historically operated at the intersection of Islamic cultural diplomacy, counterterrorism coordination, and regional security management. General Munir’s operational experience across diverse Muslim contexts, combined with Pakistan’s tradition of leveraging shared religious-cultural frameworks to build trust, could facilitate discreet channels of communication that civilian diplomats might find constrained by protocol or domestic political optics. For Washington, recognizing these dimensions means understanding that Pakistani military diplomacy often functions as a stabilizing interlocutor in regions where religious identity intersects with security calculus. The strategic implication is clear: a figure who commands institutional respect across sectarian and national lines can help de-escalate mistrust, provided the U.S. engages with cultural fluency rather than instrumentalization.

This diplomatic posture gains further significance when viewed against Pakistan’s deepening defense ties with Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Joint exercises, training agreements, and strategic dialogues have increasingly positioned Pakistan as a connective node in a loose but consequential security corridor spanning the Gulf, Anatolia, and South Asia. While this is not a formalized alliance, it reflects a pragmatic convergence of interests: counterterrorism coordination, defense industrial cooperation, and efforts to reduce regional polarization. Integrating Iran into a Pakistan-mediated diplomatic framework could serve as a stabilizing counterweight to isolation-driven security dilemmas. If Munir’s involvement helps translate Iran‑U.S. understandings into actionable security arrangements, it could function as a missing link in a broader architecture that prioritizes de-escalation, economic reintegration, and institutionalized crisis management among Muslim-majority states.

Nevertheless, the potential of such military-led diplomacy must be weighed against inherent constraints. Over-militarizing diplomatic processes risks marginalizing civilian institutions, complicating long-term democratic accountability, and triggering skepticism from Iranian hardliners or U.S. congressional actors wary of defense-centric negotiations. Moreover, Pakistan’s own economic vulnerabilities and domestic political transitions could limit its capacity to sustain high-stakes mediation without robust international backing. For the arrangement to succeed, military diplomacy must eventually interface with civilian statecraft, multilateral verification mechanisms, and transparent economic incentives to ensure durability beyond security guarantees.

In sum, General Asim Munir’s active participation in Iran‑U.S. talks would signal a strategic shift toward institutionalized, security-first diplomacy. It would underscore Pakistan’s evolving role as a regional stabilizer, leverage cultural and operational credibility to bridge trust deficits, and align with a nascent network of Muslim-state security cooperation. While not a substitute for comprehensive civilian diplomacy, such military-backed engagement could provide the continuity and assurance necessary to convert fragile understandings into durable stability. The ultimate test will lie in whether this approach can be integrated into inclusive, multilateral frameworks that balance security, sovereignty, and economic development across a deeply interconnected region.

Read also Beyond the War on Iran–The Comlex Ways Ancient Lineage Shapes Modern Diplomacy in Tehran and Pakistan

Pope Leo XIV Backs Vatican’s Stark Condemnation of Gaza “Massacre” Igniting Diplomatic Tensions

Pope Leo XIV Backs Vatican’s Stark Condemnation of Gaza “Massacre” Igniting Diplomatic Tensions

    Tuesday, October 07, 2025   No comments

 Pope Leo XIV’s Strong Gaza Remarks Set Stage for Historic Middle East Pilgrimage

The Vatican’s sharp condemnation of the war in Gaza comes at a pivotal moment—just weeks before Pope Leo XIV embarks on his first international journey as pontiff to two Muslim-majority nations in the Middle East. On Tuesday, the Holy See announced that the Pope will visit Türkiye from November 27 to 30, followed by Lebanon from November 30 to December 2. The trip, described as an “apostolic visit” to Lebanon at the invitation of the country’s president and local Church leaders, marks a significant early diplomatic and spiritual initiative for the new Pope. Against the backdrop of escalating regional tensions and deepening humanitarian crises, his upcoming pilgrimage is widely seen as an effort to promote interfaith dialogue, Christian–Muslim coexistence, and peace in a region scarred by conflict—making his recent, unflinching remarks on Gaza not only a moral statement, but a prelude to a broader mission of reconciliation.

In a rare and forceful intervention, Pope Leo XIV has publicly endorsed one of the Vatican’s strongest condemnations yet of Israel’s military campaign in Gaza—describing it as a “massacre” and urging the world not to grow numb to the daily slaughter of civilians, especially children. The Pope’s remarks, made this week from his summer residence in Castel Gandolfo near Rome, mark a significant escalation in the Holy See’s stance on the Israel–Gaza war and have drawn sharp rebuke from Israel’s embassy to the Vatican.

Pope’s top diplomat blasts Israel’s Gaza offensive as ‘ongoing massacre’

The controversy stems from an interview given by Cardinal Pietro Parolin, the Vatican’s Secretary of State and its top diplomat, on the second anniversary of Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack on Israel. While Parolin unequivocally denounced that assault—calling it “inhuman and indefensible” and expressing prayers for the remaining hostages—he reserved his harshest language for the consequences of Israel’s retaliatory campaign.

“The war between Hamas and Israel has had catastrophic and inhuman consequences,” Parolin told Vatican media. “I am shocked by the daily death of so many children, whose only sin seems to be that they were born there.” He warned against normalizing the violence: “We fear becoming accustomed to this massacre. It is unacceptable and unjustifiable to reduce human beings to mere ‘collateral damage.’”

Pope Leo XIV, who assumed the papacy in May following the death of Pope Francis, stood firmly behind Parolin’s words. When asked by reporters about Israel’s angry response, the Pope said simply: “The Cardinal expressed the position of the Holy See very well.”

That position, however, has ignited a diplomatic firestorm.

In a statement posted on X (formerly Twitter), Israel’s embassy to the Vatican expressed “regret” that the interview “focused on criticizing Israel while ignoring Hamas’s continued refusal to release hostages or end its violence.” The embassy took particular offense at the use of the word “massacre,” arguing that it wrongly equates Israel’s actions with those of Hamas. “There is no moral equivalence between a democratic state defending its citizens and a terrorist organization seeking to kill them,” the statement read. “We hope future statements will reflect this crucial distinction.”

Yet the Pope’s message went further. Speaking with palpable sorrow, he acknowledged the trauma of October 7—“a terrorist attack that killed more than 1,200 people”—but immediately juxtaposed it with the staggering toll in Gaza. “Over two years… we speak of 67,000 Palestinians killed,” he said, citing figures from Gaza’s Hamas-run health ministry. “This makes us reflect on the depth of violence and evil humanity is capable of.”

The numbers remain contested, but the human cost is undeniable. According to the AFP, 1,219 people—mostly civilians—died in Hamas’s initial assault. In response, Israel launched a military operation that has claimed at least 67,160 Palestinian lives, displaced nearly the entire population of 2.3 million, and left much of the enclave in ruins.

Cardinal Parolin emphasized that while self-defense is a legitimate right, it must adhere to the principle of proportionality—a cornerstone of just war theory long upheld by Catholic teaching. “The war to eliminate Hamas militants cannot ignore that it is being waged against an exhausted, defenseless population living on land whose buildings have been reduced to rubble,” he said.

He also issued a pointed critique of global inaction: “The international community appears paralyzed. Nations with influence have done nothing to stop this ongoing massacre.” And in a veiled but unmistakable reference to arms suppliers, he added: “It is not enough to say what is happening is unacceptable and then allow it to continue. We must seriously question the legitimacy of continuing to supply weapons used against civilians.”

This shift in tone from the Vatican is notable. Historically, the Holy See has favored quiet diplomacy and measured language in Middle East conflicts. But under Pope Leo XIV—a pontiff already signaling a more outspoken moral leadership—the Church appears unwilling to remain silent in the face of what it sees as a humanitarian catastrophe compounded by global indifference.

The Pope’s call is clear: end the hatred, return to dialogue, and pursue peaceful solutions. But as bombs continue to fall and children keep dying, his words stand as both a spiritual plea and a stark indictment of a world that watches, yet fails to act.

In the eyes of the Vatican, silence is no longer neutrality—it is complicity.

 

"Two satellite images show how Israel 'wiped out' Gaza City"

Before

After

The Mufti of the Sultanate of Oman issues an official statement about the death of Sinwar

The Mufti of the Sultanate of Oman issues an official statement about the death of Sinwar

    Monday, October 21, 2024   No comments

A few hours after the Grand Mufti of the Sultanate of Oman, Sheikh Ahmed bin Hamad Al-Khalili, mourned the Palestinians and “the entire nation for the martyrdom of the head of the political bureau of the Hamas movement", Yahya Sinwar, calling on the nation to support the resistance with all its might, he issued a strongly worded second statement against anyone who mocks the martyrs of the resistance. His Eminence said in a statement on Saturday: “No one mocks the honorable people who die as martyrs in the fields of honor in jihad for the sake of God except the vile, who has been deprived of a mind that enables him to think, (And he for whom Allah has not given light - for him there is no light). 

 The Grand Mufti’s statement came said, Friday: “We received with pride and honor the news of the martyrdom of the heroic leader Yahya Sinwar, after he spent a period in jihad and the enemy was unable to capture him.” He added, praising Sinwar: “Congratulations to him, as he passed away facing the enemy and not turning his back. For that, we, the struggling Palestinian people, and the entire nation offer our condolences.”

Al-Khalili continued: “It is a matter that calls for the entire nation to unite, and for its scholars to rise like the wind sent forth to defend its rights, and to urge it to stand up to the Zionist entity, and to support this resistance with all its might.”

The Grand Mufti of Oman praised what Sinwar had offered, stressing that “he passed away to his Lord after a journey full of holy jihad, and joined those who preceded him, men who were true to their covenant with God,” expressing his hope that those who follow him “will fill his void with the same determination and resolve.”

The Grand Mufti of Oman concluded his post by saying: “The entire nation must unite, and its scholars must rise like the wind sent forth to defend its rights,” he said. We received with great pride the news of the martyrdom of the heroic leader Yahya Sinwar, after a long career in the holy jihad, following in the footsteps of his jihadist predecessors. We hope that someone will soon succeed him to fill his void with the same determination and resolve. The entire nation must unite, and its scholars must rise like the wind to defend its rights.

Religion and war: Modern Islamic religious institutions and Gaza War

Religion and war: Modern Islamic religious institutions and Gaza War

    Thursday, December 28, 2023   No comments

There are about four centers of traditional religiouscenters of power in the modern Islamic world: Alazhar representing the so-called mainstream Sunni Islam, Saudi Arabia representing the Salafi Islam, the official sect of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Turkey under the Islamist JDP drawing authority from the fact that Turkey represented the last pan-Islamic government, and Shia centers of religious power represented by Qom (Iran), and Najaf (Iraq). The most populous Muslim nation, Indonesia, has not played a role in shaping the religious discourse, rather was a battleground for influence exerted by other centers of Religious power. 

What role and what position have these religious centers of power and authority and other national and regional religious institutions taken?

Salafism and the Gaza war

Since the start of Western colonialism, Islam has played some public role, even through silence. Saudi edition of Islam played a prominent role in the West’s war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. It created the interpretative foundation that allowed Salafists to fund and recruit fighters in support of what they called, “Islamic Jihad”. That religious propaganda resulted in the production of groups like al-Qaeda, which launched its direct attack on the US in 2001 and justified it by US support for Israel. 23 years later, with Israel carrying its most destructive and deadly attack on Palestinians, and the Saudi religious institutions, especially the office of the Mufti, went totally silent. Perhaps worried about revisiting the connection between Salafism and terrorism, the Muftis now limiting his role to addressing the Islamic rulings about personal hygiene and family relations, and leaving all other matters to the crown prince, who just visited him to check on his health.

 

Al-Azhar balancing act: support political leadership and make public statements

 

The Council of Senior Scholars at Al-Azhar Al-Sharif confirmed today, Thursday, that the massacres committed by the Israeli occupation in the Gaza Strip are “a disgrace to all those who support it with money or weapons.”

 

The Commission, headed by the Sheikh of Al-Azhar, Ahmed Al-Tayeb, said that these massacres will be a disgrace to all those who are silent about the crimes of the occupation, pointing out that the position of the Council of Senior Scholars is clear regarding this aggression against the Palestinian people.

 

The Commission announced its rejection of displacing Palestinians “from their homeland to any other place,” noting that the occupation has gone too far in its aggression, killing children and women, and striking mosques, churches, hospitals, schools, and homes, in and around Gaza.

 

The Commission also condemned the "shameful positions of the countries and governments that support the occupation" in its aggression against the Palestinian people, calling on them to listen to the voice of their people defending this issue.

 

Lebanon’s Sunni Shia divide
 

Dar Al-Fatwa suppresses sheikhs: Criticism of Geagea is forbidden!

With Shia Hezbollah direct support to Hamas in Gaza, the rest of the Sunni community is more interested in appeasing regional powers and preserving the political balance in the country than taking position on the war.

The Grand Mufti of the Republic, Sheikh Abdel-Latif Derian, came to the thoughts of Maarab and Al-Saifi, who were disturbed by the tweets of the Assistant Inspector General of Dar Al-Fatwa, Sheikh Hassan Merheb, so he decided to muzzle the mouths of the sheikhs and prevent them from expressing their opinions and political positions.

 The message delivered by the head of the Lebanese Forces Party, Samir Geagea, to Dar al-Fatwa, in protest against the positions of the Assistant Inspector General of Dar al-Fatwa, Sheikh Hassan Merheb, on his party and the Phalange Party, against the backdrop of their positions on the war on Gaza and the resistance against the Israeli enemy in Palestine and Lebanon, did not go unnoticed. The message woke up the Grand Mufti of the Republic, Sheikh Abdel Latif Derian, from his stupor. Although “His Eminence” did not move in the face of the poor living conditions of the imams of the mosques and Sharia judges, and in the face of the repercussions of the crisis on the institutions affiliated with Dar al-Fatwa and its endowments, and he was not moved by the deteriorating living and political conditions of the Sunni community, he rose up to silence the sheikhs and “hold their breath” for the sake of Samir Geagea. And Sami Al-Jamil. As a reminder, the first was convicted of killing a Sunni prime minister, and the second declared a week ago that Israel does not attack Lebanon except in self-defense! Geagea’s “outrage” did not insult the Mufti, so he issued a decision to suppress the sheikhs and confiscate their opinions, in a statement distributed by the media office last Friday, in which he said: “Based on the directives of the Mufti of the Lebanese Republic, Sheikh Abdul Latif Derian, it is strictly forbidden to make political statements, positions or opinions for all employees of the religious apparatus and institutions affiliated with Dar al-Fatwa without first obtaining written permission from the General Directorate of Islamic Endowments and the relevant relevant departments,” he pointed out. “Dar Al-Fatwa does not adopt any political opinion that does not come directly from it and rejects any position that leads to strife or disagreement among the Lebanese.”