The U.S. Problem in Lebanon and Syria

The United States’ position in Lebanon suffers from a fundamental contradiction. On the one hand, Washington insists that all weapons in Lebanon must be under the control of a strong central government. On the other hand, in neighboring Syria, the U.S. promotes a weak federal system that allows minorities—such as the Druze in the south and the Kurds in the north—to maintain their own weapons and autonomous security structures.

Logically, if the principle is that all arms should be monopolized by the state, then that principle must apply everywhere. By carving out exceptions in Syria under the pretext of “protecting minorities” and “preserving diversity,” the U.S. sets a precedent that can just as easily apply to Lebanon—a country already deeply divided along ethnic, religious, and sectarian fault lines. Lebanon fought a devastating 15-year civil war and still struggles to forge a national identity that transcends its sectarian divisions.

The deeper problem is that neither Syria nor Lebanon currently has a government that can claim full legitimacy. In Syria, today’s de facto rulers are not the product of popular mandate; they are rulers by force of war, caretakers until a fair election and an inclusive system produce a legitimate government. Lebanon, likewise, is governed not by leaders with genuine popular legitimacy but by a fragile power-sharing arrangement codified in the Ta’if Agreement. This deal distributed power along sectarian lines—giving the presidency to Christians, the prime minister’s office to Sunnis, and the speakership of parliament to Shia. It is, in effect, a three-headed system where no faction can claim full authority. Lebanon has even gone years without a president at all, underscoring the fragility of the arrangement.

A government that lacks legitimacy cannot be strong unless it imposes its will by force—and that is precisely why no group in Lebanon will truly give up its weapons. The same logic applies in Syria: until a representative system is built, demands for disarmament will be met with suspicion and resistance.

The bottom line is this: a country where power is historically acquired through war and violence cannot be remade into a cohesive state simply by granting a central government exclusive control over weapons. The evidence from recent history is overwhelming:

• Libya remains fragmented into three regions, each governed separately.

• Yemen, despite years of Saudi bombardment designed to enforce central authority, is divided into multiple competing power centers.

• Iraq, even after more than $3 trillion in U.S. investment and years of institution-building, still has a weak central government overshadowed by regional and sectarian power brokers. When ISIS surged in 2014, it was not the Iraqi state that rallied, but a new paramilitary force created by a fatwa from Shia religious authorities.

Countries torn apart by war rarely reunify quickly under strong central governments. More often, they remain weak or fragmented for decades. Even Germany—with its long history of national unity—took decades to reunify after division.

Against this backdrop, the U.S. attempt to engineer a powerful central government in Lebanon, while simultaneously promoting decentralization in Syria, is incoherent. No Lebanese Shia faction will willingly surrender its weapons to a government it views as illegitimate and incapable of protecting them—especially when extremist groups across the border in Syria have massacred minorities for not being Sunni.

If Washington continues to push for a centralized Lebanese government without real sovereignty or inclusive legitimacy, it risks destabilizing one of the most volatile regions in the world. The result may not be stability at all, but rather the ignition of another civil war in Lebanon—unless, of course, that is the unspoken objective of U.S. policy.