What do media reports and political statements about state-sanctioned assassinations and the war in Gaza mean in the big picture?
Blinken said during a forum in Colorado (west) that "the current situation is not good. Iran, because of the end of the nuclear agreement, instead of being at least a year away from being able to produce fissile material for a nuclear bomb, is now probably a week or two away from being able to do so."
He explained that Tehran "has not developed a weapon yet, but we are watching this matter closely, of course."
Blinken reiterated that "a week or two" is the estimated time for Iran to be able to produce this fissile material for the purpose of making a nuclear bomb.
He said, "What we have seen in recent weeks and months is that Iran is moving forward with this" nuclear program, reiterating the United States' goal of Tehran never having a nuclear weapon, and "preferring the diplomatic path" to achieve this.
CNN, which reported the same news explained breakout time as
being "the amount of time needed to produce enough weapons grade material
for a nuclear weapon – “is now probably one or two weeks” as Tehran has
continued to develop its nuclear program."
The US government statement was made about a month ago, July
18. If that assessment is correct, not only did Iran has more than two weeks to
reach that goal, but also was given more reasons to achieve that goal when
Israel carried out an attack inside Iran on 31 July 2024, that killed Hamas
leader, Ismael Haniyeh who was attending the inauguration of the new president.
Blinken assessment is significant for many reasons, including these two important reasons.
If US assessment is true, and given the recent development,
by Wednesday August 14th, Iran would have had two weeks since the
assassination, above and beyond the two weeks between Blinken's statement and
the assassination, which is more than the time it needs to reach the stage per
US government. This means that, now, Iran is past the breakout time, and
would have enough "weapons grade material for a nuclear
weapon".
If Iran does not produce "weapons grade material"
then US assessment is flawed about Iran's ability or wrong about its intention to do so.
In both cases, this recent development is bad news for
Western governments because their next news cycle will be to address Iran with
the reality of it possessing the nuclear material or having it and choosing not
to build a nuclear weapons. In both cases, the nuclear threat would have moved
past it being a threat, since it will be either a reality or a non-threat.
In the light of the nuclear development matter, Iran's
delayed retaliation against Israel for the assassination of a Palestinian political leader, Ismail Haniyeh, could be the most strategic response. Iran would have
used the timeline floated by high-ranking US official about the breakout time
to either make it irrelevant or to create more uncertainty about Iran's
capabilities.
The delay froze any conversation about Iran's nuclear
program and perhaps allowed the Iranian leaders to add the nuclear option just in
case Israel decides to retaliate against Iran's retaliation. Iran does not
have to announce that they have a nuclear weapon at this point; Iran could
adopt Israel’s strategic ambiguity about its nuclear capability and that would produce the
same deterring effects as announcing that it has a nuclear weapon.
Taken in a broader context, the assassination of Ismail
Haniyeh in Tehran, in effect, was the best thing that could have happened for Iran for
many reasons.
First, Iran now has the legal and moral ground to act on the
principle of self-defense.
Second, by holding official religious prayers for the dead
Sunni leader, Iran’s brand of Islam, Shia Islam, is no longer a fringe belief, as
it has been portrayed by Saudi Salafists. The fact that Hamas leaders agreed to have
two formal prayers, one in Tehran and one in Qatar, is remarkable in the view
of experts on Sunni-Shia divide.
Third, Iran’s menu of
retaliatory options has become more expansive. Iran could strike inside the 1948 border of Israel,
since the attack on Haniyeh took place in Tehran. But Iran could hit targets and military concentrations in Gaza, which will highlight the above
stated connections, and refocus attention on the primary objective that most governments
around the world want to achieve: a ceasefire in Gaza War. Also, Iran could use a surgical
strike against an Israeli leader or a military installation. Lastly, Iran’s leaders
could forgo a military tactical strike in favor of a strategic decision to
adopt a different nuclear posture and use the assassination as a justification
for developing a last resort self-defense nuclear option, something it has been
unable to do in the past.
When considered from these advantage points, it is clear that assassination is the least strategic statecraft tool, as it tends to diminish the standing and reputation of the state that rely on assassinations and bolster the strategic position of the state whose sovereignty has been violated--long-term. For these reasons, this event may end up being one of the most significant turning points of the century.
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