Politicians’ Micromanagement of the war in Ukraine is exacting a heavy cost

There is no doubt that Russian leaders started their operation in Ukraine with different calculus. They may have underestimated the cohesion of the Ukrainian armed forces, perhaps thinking that many will switch side or even overthrow the civilian leadership in order to settle the conflict with minimum losses.  By the second week of the conflict, however, Russian generals seem to have become convinced that Ukrainian generals prepared for the war and the war will be years long--not days or weeks. The Russian generals recommended retreat from areas near Kiev. The redeployment was quick, within days, Russian troops that were just 20 miles from the seat of the Ukrainian government were moved the Donbass region. Still, the Russian forces lost many troops and military hardware. 

By the fall of 2022, Russian generals also realized that their positions in the south, in Kherson, west of the Dnipro River, are difficult to defend. They recommended moving troops across the river. The ministry of defense leaders took their recommendation to the political leadership, where the recommendation was approved. Troops moved across and the bridges were destroyed to limit the chance of success of any massive counter attack by Ukrainian troops.

In contrast, when Ukrainian troops were loosing the battle in Mariupol, south of Ukraine, they were ordered to stay and fight. They stayed. The city was besieged and no one was able to escape. Those who did not die, an estimated 2000 Ukrainian troops, surrendered and were taken as POWs, some of whom were handed over in return for Russian POWs. 

The same scenario repeated itself in Soledar and other cities and town in the vicinity of Bakhmut. It is reasonable to assume that the hundreds of miles long underground tunnels and mines are very valuable defensive locations and should not be abandoned without a fight. However, when such positions cannot be defended, delaying the inevitable can have a huge strategic and tactical impact on the course of the war.

The images of Ukrainian troops dead, and those who did not die are exhaustedly walking in muddy backroad because all major roads are now under the control of Russian forces, such images can be demoralizing to the rest of the troops in nearby towns. They will be forced to think that their turn will be next and they will be thinking of escape routes, which would take their focus away from the battle. 

In an attempt to open a road for retreating troops, mechanized forces brought in heavy weapons, which exposed them to arial attacks. When these forces return to their defensive positions, such positions will be known and that will degrade their ability to launch counter attacks.

When Russian generals recommended retreat from some areas, the move was approved and the retreat took place quickly, minimizing losses. 

When Ukrainian generals recommended the same, every time the president of Ukraine ordered them to stay until the last minute, only to retreat leaving behind dead soldiers and destroyed equipment. That is the cost of politicians running the war by remote.

The outcome of the war in Ukraine may not depend on how much weapons NATO can supply to Ukraine, but how many costly mistakes politicians would make managing battles.

Here is Zelenskiy's recent statement about the reported difference of opinion; he said there was no other opinion. If true, that would be troubling state of mind.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian troops are chaotically retreating from Bakhmut, leaving behind destroyed western supplied hardware. With no major roads available for the retreating troops, they are forced to use backroads that do not allow for relocation of heavy equipment. If political leaders send more troops to reopen supply roads or to secure roads for retreating troops, those forces will be exposed and may suffer the same fate.

Here is a glimpse of Ukrainian troops retreat.