Media Review: Blockades Are Weapons of Policy for Some, Crimes for Others

Media Review: Blockades Are Weapons of Policy for Some, Crimes for Others

    Sunday, April 19, 2026   No comments

In the escalating tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz, a familiar rhetorical pattern has emerged: actions labeled "economic terrorism" or "blackmail" when undertaken by Iran are framed as legitimate instruments of statecraft when deployed by the United States and its allies (Saudi Arabia and UAE have imposed a crushing blockade against Yemen since 2017). This selective application of moral and legal judgment reveals not merely a policy disagreement, but a deeper structural asymmetry in how international norms are invoked and enforced.

In March 2026, UAE Minister of Industry and Advanced Technology Dr. Sultan Al Jaber declared at CERAWeek that "weaponizing the Strait of Hormuz is not an act of aggression against one nation. It is economic terrorism against every nation." His statement echoed U.S. rhetoric, with President Donald Trump asserting that Iran "cannot blackmail us" with threats to close the strategic waterway.

Iran's position, articulated through official channels, frames its actions differently. Tehran has demanded compensation estimated at $270 billion for infrastructure damage sustained during recent U.S.-Israeli military operations, proposing a mechanism that could include transit fees on vessels passing through the Strait. Iranian officials argue this is not coercion but a lawful claim for reparations under international law principles governing state responsibility for wrongful acts.

The accusation of "economic terrorism" directed at Iran stands in stark contrast to the documented history of U.S. foreign policy. The United States has employed economic sanctions and blockades as primary tools of statecraft for decades. Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Washington imposed comprehensive economic, trade, and financial sanctions that have expanded under successive administrations.

In 2010, the U.S. introduced "secondary sanctions" compelling foreign entities to choose between access to American markets and engagement with Iran—a form of economic coercion that significantly reduced Iranian oil exports by 1.4 million barrels per day. These measures were not framed as "terrorism" but as legitimate instruments of non-military pressure.

International law scholars note that economic sanctions have become a prominent part of the American response to foreign state involvement in international terrorism, yet the legal distinction between punitive sanctions and what critics term "economic warfare" remains contested. The Geneva Centre for Security Policy defines "economic terrorism" narrowly as attempts at economic destabilization by non-state groups, a definition that does not clearly encompass state-led sanctions regimes.

Under modern international law, blockades are considered acts of war. According to established doctrine, a blockade is legal only if applied in self-defense and conducted in accordance with principles of necessity and proportionality. The United Nations Charter permits blockades under Article 42, but only as measures authorized by the Security Council to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The Strait of Hormuz presents particular legal complexity. As an international strait, it is governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which guarantees transit passage for all vessels. The International Maritime Organization has affirmed that "freedom of navigation is a fundamental principle of international maritime law, and it must be respected by all Parties, with no exception."

However, the application of these principles in practice reveals asymmetries. While Iran's threat to restrict passage has been widely condemned, legal analysts note that a U.S. naval blockade of Iranian ports—absent explicit Security Council authorization or clear self-defense justification—also raises significant questions under international law. As one maritime security specialist observed, such a blockade "is legal under international law but contradicts the ceasefire and has limitations."

The Compensation Question: Precedent and Principle

Iran's demand for $270 billion in compensation for infrastructure damage invokes established principles of state responsibility. Under international law, states that commit internationally wrongful acts are obligated to make full reparation for injury caused. The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, established after the 1979 revolution, created precedent for adjudicating such claims through neutral arbitration.

The political reality complicates legal principle. Iran's proposal to fund compensation through a Hormuz transit protocol has been characterized by critics as leverage, while similar mechanisms—such as sanctions relief negotiated in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—were framed as diplomatic compromise. This divergence in framing underscores the central concern: when does economic pressure constitute legitimate statecraft, and when does it cross into coercion that violates sovereign equality?

International legal scholarship has noted that economic coercion is regulated differently when undertaken collectively under UN auspices, but unilateral economic pressure occupies a gray zone in international law.

The Strait of Hormuz crisis illuminates a broader challenge in international relations: the gap between the universalist aspirations of international law and the particularist practices of powerful states. When the same action—using economic leverage to achieve political ends—is condemned as "terrorism" when undertaken by one actor but normalized as "statecraft" when deployed by another, the credibility of the rules-based order erodes.

The Gaza Blockade: A Case Study in Enduring Economic Pressure

The double standard becomes even more pronounced when examining the blockade of Gaza, imposed by Israel with sustained U.S. diplomatic and material support since 2007. For nearly two decades, restrictions on the movement of people and goods through land crossings, airspace, and territorial waters have severely constrained Gaza's economy, limited access to essential supplies, and contributed to recurring humanitarian crises. International organizations, including the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross, have repeatedly warned that the blockade amounts to collective punishment, prohibited under international humanitarian law. Despite these concerns, the policy has persisted through multiple U.S. administrations. Even during periods when Washington promoted so-called "peace plans" aimed at resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the fundamental architecture of the blockade remained intact, with humanitarian exemptions often insufficient to address systemic deprivation. This continuity underscores a central contradiction: when a U.S. ally enforces a long-term blockade with profound civilian consequences, the language of "economic terrorism" is notably absent from official discourse.

Media Review: NYT on How America’s Centralized Rule Accelerates a World Forged by Iran’s Decades of Systemic Resilience

Media Review: NYT on How America’s Centralized Rule Accelerates a World Forged by Iran’s Decades of Systemic Resilience

    Monday, April 06, 2026   No comments

 The Strait of Power

A recent analysis published in prominent American media delivers a sobering reassessment of the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran. Rather than triggering the rapid collapse long anticipated in Western policy circles, the conflict has laid bare a deeper structural reality: Iran’s strategic endurance is not the product of temporary political maneuvering, but of a governance architecture meticulously constructed over four decades. Meanwhile, the United States finds itself constrained by a decision-making model increasingly concentrated in executive hands, one that repeatedly overrides institutional statecraft in favor of unilateral, short-term interventions. The result is a geopolitical reversal that Washington has struggled to anticipate.

For years, Western capitals operated under the assumption that Iran’s political and military architecture was brittle, vulnerable to economic pressure, diplomatic isolation, or targeted force. The prevailing narrative suggested the system could be dismantled in days or months. Yet the current crisis has demonstrated the opposite. Iran’s ability to exert decisive control over the Strait of Hormuz without resorting to a full blockade reveals a deeply institutionalized strategic doctrine. Over forty years, Tehran has cultivated layered capabilities in asymmetric warfare, maritime deterrence, insurance market psychology, and regional diplomatic coordination. This is not crisis improvisation; it is the output of a system engineered for strategic patience, where military, economic, and diplomatic instruments operate in sustained, interlocking harmony. The West’s narrative of fragility has collided with the reality of institutionalized resilience.

In sharp contrast, the American response reflects a governance model increasingly detached from long-term strategic continuity. Decision-making has become highly centralized, driven by one-man rule that routinely sidelines interagency consensus, institutional memory, and diplomatic frameworks. This top-down approach treats complex geopolitical ecosystems as problems solvable through executive decree or rapid military posturing. The result is a foreign policy that burns through diplomatic capital, fractures allied coordination, and substitutes systemic governance with personalized authority. Where Iran has spent generations embedding strategic redundancy and adaptive capacity into its state apparatus, the United States has increasingly outsourced long-term planning to the immediacy of centralized command, eroding the very institutional foundations that once sustained its global leadership.

The analytical core of the published view centers on how Iran’s selective control of the Strait of Hormuz has already rewritten global energy dynamics. By creating a persistent environment of risk through measured strikes, drone operations, and maritime deterrence, Iran has triggered a collapse in commercial insurance coverage and a sharp decline in shipping traffic, even while the waterway remains technically open. Modern economies do not merely require oil; they require predictable, insurable, and timely delivery. As premiums spike, shipping routes fracture, and governments treat energy procurement as a strategic vulnerability rather than a market transaction, the old Gulf order has unraveled. For decades, the region operated on a simple formula: producers exported, markets priced, and Washington guaranteed passage. That architecture is now collapsing under the weight of miscalculation.

Asian economies, deeply integrated into Gulf energy infrastructure, face immediate inflationary and trade pressures. Europe confronts the reality that energy security can no longer be assumed. Meanwhile, the United States is trapped by an asymmetry it helped create: protecting every single vessel requires a permanent, resource-draining military presence, while Iran needs only occasional strikes to make the entire insurance and logistics market unviable. As French leadership has publicly acknowledged, securing the strait now requires coordination with Tehran, not coercion against it.

This disruption is accelerating a quiet but profound realignment. China, Russia, and Iran do not require a formal alliance to reshape global energy flows; their strategic incentives naturally converge. Together, they could control nearly a third of the world’s accessible oil and gas, creating a de facto architecture that marginalizes Western economic leverage. The United States now faces a stark choice: commit to an indefinite military campaign to reclaim absolute control of the strait, or accept a new energy order where Washington no longer dictates the terms. Neither option preserves the status quo, but the latter acknowledges a structural shift that centralized decision-making has repeatedly failed to anticipate.

The crisis has laid bare a fundamental asymmetry. Iran’s endurance is not accidental; it is the product of four decades of systemic institution-building, strategic patience, and adaptive governance. America’s vulnerability, conversely, stems from a political culture that increasingly substitutes institutional continuity with executive immediacy, sacrificing long-term strategic coherence for short-term tactical assertions. The war has not shattered Iran. Instead, it has accelerated the emergence of a multipolar reality where resilience, not rupture, dictates the future. If the United States continues to prioritize one-man rule over systemic statecraft, it will not merely cede influence over global energy—it will witness the institutional foundations of its own global role erode in real time.

Media Review: Gulf States, International Law, and the Unspoken Link Between Iran Strikes and Regional Complicity

Media Review: Gulf States, International Law, and the Unspoken Link Between Iran Strikes and Regional Complicity

    Thursday, March 19, 2026   No comments

 The Sovereignty Paradox

In the corridors of the United Nations Human Rights Council this week, a diplomatic note from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states described ballistic missile and drone attacks on Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates as a "situation of serious concern for international peace and security." The note characterized these strikes as "unprovoked attacks" requiring urgent international attention, calling for reparations for civilian, infrastructure, and environmental damage.

Beneath this unified diplomatic appeal lies a complex legal and strategic reality that most international actors have been reluctant to articulate plainly: the attacks on Gulf territories are occurring within the context of a broader military campaign against Iran that numerous legal scholars and a small number of Western governments—including Spain—have characterized as inconsistent with international law.

The Legal Framework: Sovereignty, Retaliation, and Contradiction

Under the United Nations Charter, Article 2(4) prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Article 51 recognizes the inherent right of self-defense if an armed attack occurs. These principles form the bedrock of the post-1945 international legal order.

When Iran launched strikes targeting military and energy infrastructure in Gulf states hosting U.S. forces, Tehran framed these actions not as aggression against sovereign neighbors, but as targeted responses to facilities being used to conduct what it characterizes as an illegal armed campaign against Iranian territory. In a letter to the UN Secretary-General cited by Iranian state media, Iran's UN ambassador Amir Saeid Iravani stated that the UAE's decision to allow its territory to be used in attacks on Iran amounted to "an internationally wrongful act that entailed state responsibility."

This legal argument presents a challenge for states seeking to condemn Iranian actions while remaining silent on the initial use of force against Iran. As one principle of international law holds: a state cannot claim for itself rights it denies to others. If the use of another state's territory to launch attacks violates sovereignty, then the same standard must apply consistently.

Oman's Distinctive Diplomatic Position

Amid regional consensus, Oman has maintained a notably different diplomatic posture. Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi, writing in The Economist, argued that the United States has "effectively lost control of its own foreign policy" by allowing itself to be drawn into what he termed an "unwanted entanglement" with Iran.

Albusaidi described Iranian strikes on Gulf states hosting U.S. bases as "inevitable, if deeply regrettable," calling them "probably the only rational option available" in response to a war "designed to terminate" Iran. His analysis underscores a reality that complicates simple narratives of aggression: military infrastructure hosted on sovereign territory does not exist in a legal vacuum. When that infrastructure is used to project force against a neighboring state, the hosting state becomes, in the eyes of international law and strategic calculation, a participant in the conflict.

Targeting the Architecture of War: Radar Sites and Military Infrastructure

An analysis by ABC News of satellite imagery and verified footage indicates that Iranian drones and missiles have struck at least 10 radar sites used by the U.S. and its allies across West Asia since the conflict escalated. These include facilities at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, sites in the UAE, Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, Camp Arifjan in Kuwait, Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, and the U.S. Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain.

Experts note that radar systems are both vital and vulnerable: their emissions make them detectable, and even partial damage can degrade detection capabilities, effectively "blinding" segments of missile defense networks. The targeting of these assets reflects a strategic calculation: disrupting the early-warning architecture that enables offensive operations.

From a legal perspective, the distinction between "military" and "civilian" infrastructure becomes critical. International humanitarian law requires parties to distinguish between military objectives and civilian objects. However, when military assets are embedded within or adjacent to civilian infrastructure—as is often the case with radar installations near population centers—the legal and humanitarian consequences multiply.

International Responses: A Spectrum of Legal Interpretation

While Gulf states have sought emergency UN debate over Iranian strikes, the international response has revealed significant divergence in legal interpretation.

Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez has been among the clearest Western voices, stating ahead of a recent EU summit that the war on Iran is "illegal," has "no reason behind it," and is causing significant harm to civilians, refugees, and economies. Sánchez linked the conflict to wider Middle East tensions, emphasizing that the EU must send a clear message supporting multilateralism and international law.

China's Foreign Ministry stated it is "always opposed to the use of force in international relations" and expressed shock at remarks by Israeli officials regarding targeting Iranian leadership. The UN Secretary-General has called on all parties to end a conflict "that is risking to get completely out of control, causing immense suffering on civilians."

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas emphasized that "member states do not have an appetite to go to this war" and that "we need an exit from this war, not escalation." These statements reflect a growing recognition that military escalation carries profound humanitarian and economic risks without clear strategic resolution.

Economic Dimensions: Hormuz, Sanctions, and Energy Security

The conflict's economic stakes are substantial. Iran is reportedly weighing legislation to impose transit fees on ships moving through the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20% of global oil trade passes. An advisor to Iran's supreme leader suggested that "a new regime for the Strait of Hormuz" could enable Tehran to enforce maritime limits on countries that have imposed sanctions.

Meanwhile, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent indicated that the United States "may unsanction the Iranian oil that's on the water"—approximately 140 million barrels—to manage global energy prices. This potential policy shift underscores how economic instruments are being recalibrated in response to military realities.

Strikes on key gas fields have sparked fears of broader energy market disruption. With three of the world's top gas producers facing sustained attacks, analysts warn of risks that could reshape global energy supply chains.

The Narrative Imperative: Consistency and Credibility in International Discourse

The central diplomatic challenge emerging from this crisis is not merely military but narrative. States that condemn attacks on their sovereignty while facilitating military operations against others from their territory face a credibility gap that undermines their diplomatic standing.

International law does not permit selective application. If sovereignty is inviolable, it must be inviolable for all. If the use of force requires justification under Article 51, that justification must meet the same threshold regardless of the actor. When states house radar stations, military bases, and allow airspace to be used for operations against a neighbor, they cannot credibly claim non-participation in the resulting conflict.

This is not a matter of assigning blame but of upholding the consistency that gives international law its authority. As legal scholars have noted, the prohibition on the use of force is a jus cogens norm—a peremptory principle from which no derogation is permitted. Its application cannot be contingent on political alignment.

Pathways Forward

Oman's Foreign Minister suggested that while diplomacy may be "certainly difficult" after repeated shifts from negotiations to military action, "the path away from war … may have to lie through precisely this resumption." This perspective acknowledges that sustainable resolution requires addressing root causes, not merely managing symptoms.

For Gulf states, the immediate challenge is balancing legitimate security concerns with the long-term strategic imperative of regional stability. For the international community, the test is whether principles of international law can be applied consistently, even when politically inconvenient.

The current crisis underscores a fundamental truth of international relations: narratives matter. Credibility is earned not through selective condemnation but through principled consistency. In a region where historical grievances and strategic competition intersect, the only durable foundation for peace is a shared commitment to the rules that were designed to prevent exactly this kind of escalation.

As the UN chief warned, this conflict risks getting "completely out of control." Preventing that outcome requires more than emergency debates or targeted sanctions. It requires the courage to state obvious truths: that sovereignty is indivisible, that international law applies to all, and that lasting security cannot be built on the selective application of principles that were meant to protect everyone.

The High Cost of Reactive Strategy

The High Cost of Reactive Strategy

    Sunday, March 15, 2026   No comments

Oil, Sanctions, and the Global Economy

In the complex arena of geopolitical economics, few tools are as potent as oil sanctions, and few markets are as sensitive as global energy. A recent policy shift involving the temporary suspension of sanctions on Russian oil has sparked intense debate among economists and strategists. The decision, framed as a necessary move to stabilize soaring energy prices following heightened tensions in the Middle East, reveals a deeper tension between short-term economic relief and long-term strategic coherence. While the immediate goal is to lower costs for consumers, the underlying logic risks creating perverse incentives that could prolong instability and undermine the very mechanisms designed to enforce global norms.

The Mechanics of the Crisis

To understand the gravity of this decision, one must first understand the leverage points involved. Oil is the lifeblood of the modern industrial economy. When supply is disrupted—whether by conflict in the Strait of Hormuz or production cuts—prices spike. These spikes ripple outward, increasing the cost of transportation, manufacturing, and food production, ultimately fueling inflation that hurts households worldwide.

Sanctions are traditionally used as a non-military tool to pressure nations into changing behavior. There are most effective when they are done by consensus and in accordance to international norms. By cutting a country like Russia off from the global oil market, the anti-Russia block aims to deprive it of the revenue needed to fund conflict. However, this tool is a double-edged sword. Restricting supply from a major producer inevitably tightens the global market, driving prices up.

The recent announcement to pause these sanctions was justified by the need to flood the market with additional supply to counteract price hikes caused by regional conflict involving Iran. The stated intention is temporary: once the crisis abates and prices stabilize, the sanctions will return. On the surface, this appears to be a pragmatic humanitarian adjustment. Yet, when examined through the lens of game theory and strategic incentives, the move exposes a significant vulnerability in reactive policymaking.

The Strategic Flaw: A Lesson in Incentives

The core criticism of this policy is not about the desire for affordable oil, but about the signal it sends to adversarial actors. By linking the relief of sanctions on one front (Russia) to the resolution of a conflict on another (Iran), the policy inadvertently creates a profitable alliance between disparate actors who benefit from continued instability.

This dynamic can be understood through a simple analogy. Imagine a neighborhood where a child, let's call him R, is banned from selling lemonade because his friend, I, is sharing profits with him. The ban is meant to punish I. However, I responds by blocking other kids from selling lemonade too, creating a shortage that drives prices sky-high. Seeing the high prices, R's father lifts the ban on R, saying he can sell again until I stops blocking the others.

In this scenario, what is R's best move? Rational self-interest dictates that R should encourage I to keep blocking the competition. As long as the shortage persists, the price of lemonade remains high. R can sell less volume but make more profit, sharing the excess with I. The punishment intended for I has been neutralized, and both parties are now financially incentivized to maintain the crisis rather than resolve it.

Translating this to the global stage, the temporary easing of sanctions on Russian oil removes the pressure on Moscow to seek peace or de-escalate. Instead, it allows Russia to continue generating revenue while global prices remain elevated due to the unrelated conflict with Iran. If the promise to "reinstate sanctions later" lacks credibility or enforceability, the leverage is lost entirely. The market perceives the pause not as a temporary fix, but as a weakening of resolve, encouraging other nations to test the limits of economic coercion.

Implications for the World Economy

The economic implications of this strategic misalignment are profound. First, it introduces volatility into energy markets. Investors and industries thrive on predictability. When sanctions policy becomes reactive—shifting based on the latest headline rather than a cohesive long-term plan—it creates uncertainty. This uncertainty can lead to hoarding, speculative trading, and further price swings, negating the intended stabilizing effect of the policy.

Second, it risks entrenching inflation. If the structural incentives keep oil supplies artificially constrained by geopolitical maneuvering rather than genuine scarcity, the baseline cost of energy remains high. This "conflict premium" becomes embedded in the global economy, slowing growth and reducing the standard of living for consumers worldwide.

Third, and perhaps most dangerously, it erodes the efficacy of sanctions as a diplomatic tool. Sanctions rely on the threat of economic pain to change behavior. If that pain can be easily alleviated by shifting geopolitical winds, the threat loses its teeth. Future attempts to use economic pressure to halt aggression may be ignored by adversaries who anticipate similar waivers will be granted when prices rise.

The Need for Strategic Coherence

The situation underscores a fundamental principle of statecraft: tactics must serve strategy, not replace it. Lowering oil prices is a worthy goal, but not if it comes at the cost of empowering aggressors or dismantling the frameworks designed to maintain international security. A more robust approach would involve stopping aggression: any and all acts attacking sovereign nations outside the framework of International Law.

Using the most powerful hammer, armed forces, to hit every nail that appears, without a plan for the structural damage left behind, risks leaving a trail of destruction that will be costly to repair. The global economy requires leadership that anticipates second-order effects—understanding that a decision made to solve today's price spike could tomorrow's conflict longer and more expensive.

In the end, the lesson is clear. In an interconnected world, economic decisions are never isolated. They send signals, create incentives, and shape the behavior of nations. When those signals are mixed, and the incentives reward instability, the entire global system pays the price. True stability comes not from reactive pauses, but from a consistent, strategic vision that aligns economic tools with long-term peace and security.

China, Pakistan agree with Kabul to expand CPEC to Afghanistan

China, Pakistan agree with Kabul to expand CPEC to Afghanistan

    Wednesday, May 21, 2025   No comments

Pakistan, China, and Afghanistan agreed in a trilateral meeting in Beijing to formally extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Afghanistan, strengthening regional connectivity under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

The foreign ministers emphasized deeper cooperation in trade, infrastructure, and security, reaffirming their commitment to counterterrorism and regional stability. 

The next trilateral meeting will be held in Kabul. The talks took place during Deputy PM Ishaq Dar’s visit to China, which also addressed the recent Pakistan-India tensions and reaffirmed the strong China-Pakistan partnership.

The Political Instrumentalization of “Terrorism” and Sanctions in Contemporary Foreign Policy

The Political Instrumentalization of “Terrorism” and Sanctions in Contemporary Foreign Policy

    Thursday, May 15, 2025   No comments

 The recent developments surrounding former jihadist Ahmed al-Sharaa—formerly known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani—and his transformation from a wanted terrorist leader into a sitting president welcomed by the President of the United States illustrate a deeply troubling fact in international relations: the arbitrary use of the “terrorism” label and economic sanctions as tools of political convenience rather than principled governance.

In 2013, al-Sharaa was designated by the United States as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” due to his leadership of the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra, and his alleged role in orchestrating suicide bombings. At one point, the U.S. placed a $10 million bounty on his capture. Today, however, he shares tea and diplomatic smiles with President Donald Trump, without any transparent legal or procedural process to formally clear his name of terrorism charges. This dramatic pivot—absent any public renunciation of past actions, judicial review, or commitment to democratic norms like elections—exposes the malleability of the terrorism designation when it becomes inconvenient for geopolitical strategy... read more >>